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ARTICLES
PROSECUTION AND RACE: THE POWER
AND PRIVILEGE OF DISCRETION
Angela J. Davis*
For everyone to whom much is given, from him much will be re-
quired; and to whom much has been committed, of him they will ask
the more.'
T was the happiest day of David McKnight's life.2 That evening, he
went to a bar in Washington, D.C., to celebrate. Mr. McKnight
bought a bottle of Dom Perignon and popped it open ceremoniously.
"Drinks for everybody-my treat!," he announced. "What are we
celebrating?," someone asked. "I killed someone and got away with
it!," replied Mr. McKnight. He had just learned that a District of Co-
lumbia grand jury had voted not to indict him for the murder of John
Nguyen.
The year was 1987. I was a staff attorney at the Public Defender
Service for the District of Columbia ("PDS"). The court had ap-
pointed Michele Roberts, the chief of our trial division, to represent
Mr. McKnight. The case was one of the most peculiar I observed in
my dozen years as a public defender in the nation's capital.3 Two fac-
tors were noteworthy. First, someone had been brutally killed, and
the grand jury, with a silent and consenting prosecuting attorney, de-
cided that the killer should go free. Second, the accused killer was
* Associate Professor of Law, American University, Washington College of
Law. B.A., Howard University; J.D., Harvard Law School; former staff attorney,
Deputy Director and Director of the Public Defender Service for the District of Co-
lumbia. I owe a special debt of gratitude to Professors Paul Butler, Samuel Gross,
and Tracey Meares, who read and critiqued numerous drafts and spent countless
hours helping me develop the ideas for this article. I also thank Professors Jamin
Raskin, Ira Robbins, and Carol Steiker for their helpful comments and suggestions on
various drafts and Michael Barbosa for his helpful research assistance. This article
also benefited from the advice and recommendations of members of the law faculty at
American University, the University of Michigan, Rutgers, and Washington and Lee.
Finally, I am most grateful to Sean O'Brien, whose superb research assistance, expert
editorial advice, and insightful suggestions were essential to the completion of this
article.
1. Luke 12:48 (King James).
2. The names of the defendant and decedent are fictitious.
3. The case was peculiar, not because it was an aberration, but because it was the
most egregious example of a phenomenon that I observed throughout my career as a
public defender.
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white.4 The way the case was handled convinced me that the two fac-
tors were related.
David McKnight was a twenty-five year old white male who worked
as a bartender in a restaurant in Washington, D.C. He lived in a small,
one bedroom apartment that he shared with John Nguyen, a fifty-five
year old Vietnamese immigrant who worked as a cook in the restau-
rant. Mr. Nguyen paid Mr. McKnight rent to sleep in the walk-in
closet of the apartment, a space barely large enough for a small bed.
One Saturday evening, McKnight invited a woman friend to the
apartment. Nguyen was in the apartment at the time, resting in his
"bedroom" closet. McKnight tried to persuade the woman to spend
the night with him, but she declined. After she left, Nguyen came out
of the closet and teased McKnight about his failed romance. Already
upset about the turn of the evening's events, McKnight became even
more enraged. He attacked Nguyen with a large machete. McKnight
was much taller and heavier than Nguyen, who was just over five feet
tall. Nguyen was able to escape into the bathroom, but McKnight
hacked the bathroom door open with the machete. He then "almost
sliced [Mr. Nguyen] in half."5 Nguyen managed to stagger out of the
apartment and into the street. Both men were covered with Nguyen's
blood. Ironically, the first ambulance on the scene picked up Mc-
Knight, leaving Nguyen dying in the street. A second ambulance
came for Nguyen and took him to the hospital. He died later that
night.
Michele Roberts was appointed to represent McKnight on the fol-
lowing Monday morning.6 The United States Attorney's office
charged McKnight with assault with a dangerous weapon, not murder,
despite the fact that Nguyen had died the previous Saturday night.
The magistrate released McKnight pending the trial of his case.
The case never went to trial. The prosecutor, who was white, called
Ms. Roberts within a day or two and invited her to identify witnesses
who might testify before the grand jury on behalf of McKnight.7 The
prosecutor suggested that McKnight might have a good claim of self-
4. Very few whites were charged with crimes in the Superior Court of the District
of Columbia. I was a public defender for twelve years and carried a full caseload for
six years. I represented only two white defendants during those years. The exper-
iences of my colleagues were very similar.
5. Telephone Interview with Michele Roberts, partner, Rochon, Roberts, and
Stern (Dec. 18, 1997).
6. The court determined that Mr. McKnight was indigent and eligible for a court-
appointed attorney.
7. In the District of Columbia, as in federal court, felony cases are presented to a
grand jury by the prosecutor. The grand jury hears evidence and decides whether
there is probable cause to believe the defendant committed the crime. If it finds
probable cause, the grand jury issues a formal charging document called an indict-
ment, the case is assigned to a judge, and a trial date is set. If the grand jury does not
issue an indictment, the case is dismissed. The grand jury hearings are secret proceed-
ings conducted by the prosecutor. Neither defense attorneys nor any member of the
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defense and thought there might be witnesses who could testify about
Nguyen's reputation for violence and McKnight's peaceful reputation.
Ms. Roberts was stunned. She had been a trial lawyer at PDS for
seven years and had probably tried more homicide cases than any
other lawyer in the office. As the trial chief of the office, she had
supervised most of the homicide cases handled by PDS. Ms. Roberts
had never before received or heard of such an offer by a prosecutor to
assist a criminal defendant, especially one who may have been guilty
of murder.
Ms. Roberts identified witnesses willing to testify on behalf of Mc-
Knight. Although defense attorneys are not allowed to be present
during grand jury hearings, the witnesses informed her that they
would testify about McKnight's good character. Several weeks later,
the prosecutor informed Ms. Roberts that the grand jury voted not to
indict McKnight. All charges were dismissed. Ms. Roberts was never
told about the testimony before the grand jury or whether the prose-
cutor advocated for McKnight.'
Did race have anything to do with the outcome of McKnight's case?
My colleagues and I were convinced that it did. It seemed obvious to
us that the fact that McKnight was white and his victim was a
Vietnamese immigrant had everything to do with the prosecutor's un-
usual attitude about prosecuting the case. Most of my colleagues and
I had handled cases with much stronger evidence of self defense, but
never had the prosecutor offered to present this exculpatory evidence
to the grand jury. These cases generally proceeded to trial.
Mr. McKnight's case is just one example of many cases I handled or
observed during my dozen years as a public defender in Washington,
D.C., in which it appeared that the defendant or victim was treated
differently based on his race. Almost always, this disparate treatment
was the result of action taken by the prosecutor at the charging, plea
bargaining, trial, or sentencing stage of the case. This phenomenon
was so common that the attorneys in my office assumed that if the
victim in a particular case was white, the defendant would surely be
treated more harshly by the prosecutor. The plea bargain would be
either unattractive or nonexistent and the prosecutor would devote
more attention to the case. The converse was true for the few white
clients represented by the office during my twelve-year stint. They
public are allowed to be present. See infra notes 34-48 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the grand jury and the prosecution function).
8. Ms. Roberts refused to reveal the name of the prosecutor. She indicated that
the prosecutor was still handling cases in the United States Attorney's Office for the
District of Columbia. Ms. Roberts stated that if she revealed the prosecutor's name,
this author's attempts to interview him, and the possibility that his name might be
published would ruin her relationship with him, and thus her ability to obtain infor-
mation and negotiate plea bargains for current and future clients. Telephone Inter-
view with Michele Roberts, partner, Rochon, Roberts, and Stern (March 29, 1998).
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would receive favorable treatment or, like Mr. McKnight, even have
their cases dismissed.9
At every step of the criminal process, there is evidence that African
Americans are not treated as well as whites-both as victims of crime
and as criminal defendants."a And because prosecutors play such a
dominant and commanding role in the criminal justice system through
9. There was a running joke in the office that any lawyer who could not get a
good deal for a white client should turn in his license to practice law.
10. For a discussion of race discrimination in the criminal justice system, see gen-
erally Randall Kennedy, Race, Crime and the Law (1997) (exploring the history of
race discrimination in the criminal justice system); Coramae Richey Mann, Unequal
Justice: A Question of Color (1993) (studying discrimination in the criminal justice
system against African Americans, Asian Americans, Hispanic Americans, and Na-
tive Americans); Jerome G. Miller, Search and Destroy (1996) (theorizing that so
many persons have been run through jails and prisons that the violent ethos of the
correctional facility has increasingly come to shape behavior on the streets and under-
mine respect for the law); Katheryn K. Russell, The Color of Crime (1998) (noting
that racism continues to undermine society's criminal justice system and skews the
public's perception of its black citizens and crime); Samuel Walker et al., The Color of
Justice: Race, Ethnicity, and Crime in America (1996) (examining the racial and eth-
nic discrimination and victimization of minorities in the criminal justice system); Rob-
ert D. Crutchfield, et al., Analytical and Aggregation Biases in Analyses of
Imprisonment: Reconciling Discrepancies in Studies of Racial Disparity, 31 J. Res.
Crime & Delinq. 166 (1994) (same); Angela J. Davis, Benign Neglect of Racism in the
Criminal Justice System, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 1660 (1996) (criticizing Tonry, infra, for
trivializing the role of racial bias in the overrepresentation of African American men
in the criminal justice system); Christopher Johns, The Color of Justice, Ariz. Repub-
lic, July 4, 1993, at C1 (finding discrimination against minorities in arrest rates,
prosecutorial discretion, and sentencing). But see Michael Tonry, Malign Neglect:
Race, Crime, and Punishment in America 49 (1995) (arguing that, with the exception
of drug offenses, higher representation of African American men in the criminal jus-
tice system is the result of disproportionate offending, not racial bias by police and
other criminal justice officials); William Wilbanks, The Myth of a Racist Criminal Jus-
tice System (1987) (acknowledging racism in the criminal justice system but conclud-
ing that the bulk of racial disproportionality in incarceration reflects greater
involvement by African Americans in serious crimes like homicide and robbery); Al-
fred Blumstein, Racial Disproportionality of U.S. Prison Populations Revisited, 64 U.
Colo. L. Rev. 743 (1993) (same).
The author's decision to focus on discrimination against African Americans in the
criminal justice system is in no way meant to minimize the significance of similar
treatment of Latinos, Asian Americans, and Native Americans. The focus on African
Americans stems from a recognition of the extent to which the treatment of African
Americans, more than other racial and ethnic groups, has dominated the development
of criminal law and procedure in American history. See A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., In
the Matter of Color: Race and the American Legal Process, The Colonial Period
(1978) (tracing the black experience in colonial America); Kennedy, supra, at xii. But
see Margaret E. Montoya, Of "Subtle Prejudices," White Supremacy, and Affirmative
Action: A Reply to Paul Butler, 68 U. Colo. L. Rev. 891, 924 (1997) (criticizing Profes-
sor Paul Butler for focusing on the African American experience to the exclusion of
Latinos). In addition, although there is a dearth of empirical research on the dispa-
rate treatment of African Americans in the criminal justice system, there is even less
data on the treatment of Latinos, Asian Americans and Native Americans. Federal
statistics include American Indians, Alaska Natives, Asians, and Pacific Islanders in
one category. See Darrell K. Gilliard & Allen J. Beck, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Prison
and Jail Inmates at MidYear 1996, at 6 tbl.7 (1997).
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the exercise of broad, unchecked discretion, their role in the complex-
ities of racial inequality in the criminal process is inextricable and
profound."
In this article, I examine prosecutorial discretion-a major cause of
racial inequality in the criminal justice system. I argue that
prosecutorial discretion may instead be used to construct effective so-
lutions to racial injustice.12 Prosecutors, more than any other officials
11. This author's focus on prosecutorial discretion does not suggest that prosecu-
tors are the only, or even the primary, cause of discrimination in the criminal justice
system. The causes of, and possible solutions for, race discrimination in the criminal
justice system are as varied and complex as the causes of, and possible solutions for,
discrimination in society as a whole. See Jennifer L. Hochschild, Facing Up To The
American Dream: Race, Class & The Soul Of The Nation (1995) (arguing that the
American dream is in danger of being abandoned because of critical racial and class
factors); Douglas S. Massey & Nancy A. Denton, American Apartheid: Segregation
and the Making of the Underclass (1993) (examining how racial and residential segre-
gation aid in the perpetuation of black poverty, crime, and social disorder); Racial
Discrimination in the United States (Thomas F. Pettigrew ed., 1975); Charles W.
Bowser, Race Relations in the 1980s: The Case of the United States, 15 Black Stud. 307
(1985).
Nor does this author suggest that discrimination by criminal justice officials is the
only cause of racial disparity in the criminal justice system. Larger societal phenom-
ena such as poverty, white supremacy, and decisions about which behaviors are
criminalized all contribute to the disproportionate involvement of African Americans
and other people of color in the criminal justice system. See generally Marc Mauer
and Tracey Huling, Young Black Americans and the Criminal Justice System: Five
Years Later (1995) (reporting that the percentage of African American young men
under control of the criminal justice system has risen from one-fourth to one-third,
and discussing possible reasons); Tonry, supra note 10 (noting that blacks' presence in
the criminal justice system is greatly out of proportion to their presence in the general
population); Paul Butler, Affirnative Action and the Criminal Law, 68 U. Colo. L
Rev. 841 (1997) (noting that over half of all men and almost half of the women in
prisons are black).
12. This article will focus on race discrimination, but class and socio-economic sta-
tus are both relevant to the treatment of criminal defendants and victims of crime.
From the police, prosecutors, lawyers, judges, and other officials who run the system
to the defendants and victims who are drawn into it unwillingly, the behavior and
treatment of almost everyone involved in the criminal justice process reflect the com-
plex social mechanisms of race and class. For a discussion of the relevance of both
race and socio-economic status to discriminatory behavior by criminal justice officials,
see Derrick Bell, And We Are Not Saved: The Elusive Quest for Racial Justice 5
(1987) (noting that "race-related disadvantages" are "now as likely to be a result as
much of social class as of color"); Tonry, supra note 10, at 62-63 (discussing critiques
of criminal justice statistics as reflecting racial and class bias); Angela J. Davis, It's
Class and Race, Wash. Post, Nov. 25, 1995, at A19 (arguing that both race and class
discrimination exist in the criminal justice system).
It is often difficult to discern whether discrimination is based on race, class, or both.
Frst, the number of Americans living in poverty are disproportionately African
American, and African Americans are disproportionately poor. See Sheldon Danziger
& Peter Gottschalk, America Unequal 73-74 (1995) (discussing data showing dispro-
portionate rate of African American poverty). Second, because discrimination is
often unintentional or unconscious, and thus unacknowledged, its origin is sometimes
difficult to discern. See infra Part II.B.1. It appears that Mr. McKnight's disparate
treatment, discussed at the beginning of this section, was clearly based on race, since
he was indigent like most of the criminal defendants in the District of Columbia.
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in the system, have the power, discretion, and responsibility to remedy
the discriminatory treatment of African Americans in the criminal jus-
tice process. Through the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, prose-
cutors make decisions that not only often predetermine the outcome
of criminal cases, but also contribute to the discriminatory treatment
of African Americans as both criminal defendants and victims of
crime. I suggest that this discretion, which is almost always exercised
in private, gives prosecutors more power than any other criminal jus-
tice officials, 13 with practically no corresponding accountability to the
public they serve. 14 Thus, I maintain that prosecutors, through their
overall duty to pursue justice, have the responsibility to use their dis-
cretion to help eradicate the discriminatory treatment of African
Americans in the criminal justice system.
Courts have consistently upheld and sanctioned prosecutorial dis-
cretion, and make it increasingly difficult to mount legal challenges to
discretionary decisions that have a discriminatory effect on African
American criminal defendants and crime victims. 5 These challenges
are usually brought as selective prosecution claims under the Equal
Protection Clause, requiring a nearly impossible showing that the
prosecutor intentionally discriminated against the defendant or the
victim. One reason this standard is so difficult to meet is that much of
the discriminatory treatment of defendants and victims may be based
on unconscious racism and institutional bias rather than on discrimi-
natory intent. Another reason is the exacting legal standard for ob-
taining discovery of information that would help to prove
discriminatory intent when it does exist. 6
In this article, I suggest a solution that would promote equal protec-
tion of the laws through the electoral process and help address the
difficult legal challenges to discriminatory treatment. I propose the
use of racial impact studies in prosecution offices to advance the re-
sponsible, nondiscriminatory exercise of prosecutorial discretion. 7
Other examples of disparate treatment, like the discrimination alleged in United
States v. Armstrong, infra Part III.C, also clearly appear to be based on race rather
than class. Race and class discrimination, however, are not always so distinct or
discernable.
13. See Charles P. Bubany & Frank F. Skillern, Taming the Dragon: An Adminis-
trative Law for Prosecutorial Decision Making, 13 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 473, 477 (1976)
(describing the prosecutor as "the single most powerful figure in the administration of
criminal justice"); Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. Pitt. L. Rev.
393,448 (1992) ("[T]he American prosecutor, owing to a variety of social and political
factors, has emerged as the most pervasive and dominant force in criminal justice.").
14. See infra Part III; see also Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discre-
tion, 86 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 717, 722 (1996) (arguing that "the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion" should be tied to "the availability of prison resources").
15. See infra Part III.
16. See infra Part V (discussing United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996)).
17. A number of scholars have discussed the advantages and disadvantages of
prosecutorial discretion and have proposed strategies for limiting or guiding its use.
See infra Part V.A.
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The crux of the racial impact studies is the collection and publication
of data on the race of the defendant and the victim in each case for
each category of offense, and the action taken at each step of the crim-
inal process. This data would then be analyzed to determine if race
had a statistically significant correlation with various prosecutorial de-
cisions. The studies would serve a number of purposes. First, they
would reveal whether there is disparate treatment of African Ameri-
can defendants or victims.18 Second, they may reveal the discrimina-
tory impact of race-neutral discretionary decisions and policies.
Third, they would help prosecutors make informed decisions about
the formulation of policies and establish standards to guide the exer-
cise of discretion in specific cases. Finally, the publication of these
studies would inform criminal defendants, crime victims, and the gen-
eral public about the exercise of prosecutorial discretion and force
prosecutors to be accountable for their decisions. Publication of the
information would help inform the general public about prosecutorial
practices so they may more effectively hold prosecutors accountable
through the electoral process. Publication may also help criminal de-
fendants alleging race-based selective prosecution to overcome the
strict discovery standard set by the Supreme Court in United States v.
Armstrong.
Racial impact studies may reveal illegitimate differential treatment
based on unconscious racism or class bias, or legitimately different
outcomes based on disproportionate offending and uninterested or
uncooperative victims. The studies may also reveal that there is no
differential treatment, thereby invalidating misperceptions of unfair-
ness. In any case, the availability of the information would be invalua-
ble in improving the overall administration of criminal justice. As
Justice Brandeis said, "Sunlight is said to be the best of
disinfectants." 19
Part I of this Article explains the importance and impact of the
prosecution function. Part II discusses the role of race and racism in
discretionary prosecutorial decisions. Part InI examines the difficulty
in bringing successful legal challenges to discriminatory prosecutorial
decisions. Part IV suggests the use of prosecutorial discretion as a
remedy for race discrimination in the criminal justice system. Finally,
Part V proposes the use of racial impact studies in prosecution offices
to advance the responsible, nondiscriminatory exercise of
prosecutorial discretion.
18. Disparate impact occurs when policies or laws affect groups of people differ-
ently. Disparate impact may or may not reflect discriminatory intent. See Tonry,
supra note 10, at 81-123 (criticizing defenses of anti-drug policies that point to the lack
of observable discriminatory intent but ignore disparate impact of such policies on
African Americans).
19. Louis D. Brandeis, Other People's Money, and How the Bankers Use It 62
(1914).
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I. THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION
Like the decisions of many officials in the criminal justice system,
prosecutorial decisions often have a discriminatory effect on African
Americans. The decisions and actions of prosecutors-and thus the
discriminatory effect of these decisions-have greater impact and
more serious consequences than those of any other criminal justice
official. This great influence and its consequences stem from the ex-
traordinary, almost unreviewable, discretion and power of
prosecutors.
The Supreme Court has consistently advanced a number of reasons
for deferring to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. These rea-
sons include: "(1) promoting prosecutorial and judicial economy and
avoiding delay; (2) preventing the chilling of law enforcement; (3)
avoiding the undermining of prosecutorial effectiveness; and (4) ad-
hering to the constitutional principle of separation of powers" and de-
ferring to the expertise of prosecutors.2" The Court has expressed
concern that allowing inquiries into a prosecutor's motives might have
a chilling effect on the performance of her law enforcement duties and
may undermine her effectiveness by disclosing law enforcement poli-
cies.21 Although these concerns may have some merit,22 they cannot
be used to justify the abuse of prosecutorial power.
Despite its potential abuse, however, prosecutorial discretion is nec-
essary. It is difficult to imagine a fair and workable system that does
not include some level of measured discretion in the prosecutorial
process. One easily thinks of the prototypical case of a poor man who
steals a loaf of bread to feed his starving family. Few would question
the propriety or fairness of a prosecutorial decision to dismiss criminal
charges against this criminal defendant. Such a decision could not be
made in the absence of some level of discretion.23
The deficiency of prosecutorial discretion lies not in its existence,
but in the randomness and arbitrariness of its application. Even in
prosecution offices that promulgate general policies for the prosecu-
tion of criminal cases,24 there is no effective mechanism for enforce-
20. See Robert Heller, Selective Prosecution and the Federalization of Criminal
Law: The Need for Meaningfid Judicial Review of Prosecutorial Discretion, 145 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 1309, 1326 (1997); see also infra Part III (discussing these issues).
21. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 462 (1996) (citation omitted).
22. For criticisms of the arguments in support of judicial deference to
prosecutorial discretion, see Kenneth Culp Davis, Discretionary Justice: A Prelimi-
nary Inquiry 210 (1969); Heller, supra note 20, at 1328-41.
23. See Davis, supra note 22, at 9-12 (citing examples of discretionary decisions
made by prosecutors and other government administrators); Abraham S. Goldstein,
The Passive Judiciary: Prosecutorial Discretion and the Guilty Plea 12-24 (1981) (dis-
cussing the prosecutor's discretion not to press criminal charges against a defendant).
24. See James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 Harv. L.
Rev. 1521, 1543 (1981) (discussing federal and state policies on prosecutorial
discretion).
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ment or public accountability. Self-regulation by prosecution offices is
largely nonexistent or ineffective," and Supreme Court jurisprudence
has protected prosecutors from both public and judicial scrutiny. 6
The arbitrary use of prosecutorial discretion greatly exacerbates ra-
cial disparities in the criminal process. The collection and publication
of data in the form of racial impact studies would educate prosecutors
and the public about the racial effects of discretionary prosecutorial
decisions. Before exploring these effects, though, it is important to
understand the function and significance of prosecutorial decisions in
the criminal process. The remainder of this part explores the prosecu-
tor's role in charging and plea bargaining decisions.
A. The Charging Decision
The first and "most important function exercised by a prosecutor" is
the charging decision.' Although police officers decide whether to
arrest a suspect, the prosecutor decides whether he should be formally
charged with a crime and what the charge should be.' This decision is
entirely discretionary.29 Even if there is probable cause to believe the
suspect has committed a crime, the prosecutor may decide to dismiss
the case and release the suspect.30 She may also file a charge that is
either more or less serious than that recommended by the police of-
ficer, as long as there is probable cause to believe the suspect commit-
25. See id. at 1544-45 (discussing limited effectiveness of self-regulation by prose-
cutors in ensuring fairness to defendants). For a proposal to improve prosecutors'
accountability to the public, see Anne Bowen Poulin, Prosecutorial Discretion and
Selective Prosecution: Enforcing Protection After United States v. Armstrong, 34 Am.
Crim. L. Rev. 1071, 1119-22 (1997) (advocating mandatory record-keeping by prose-
cutors on cases prosecuted and not prosecuted and police stops and arrests, to aid in
evaluating selective prosecution claims and to encourage better self-regulation by
prosecutors).
26. See infra Part III.B.
27. See Kenneth J. Melilli, Prosecutorial Discretion in an Adversary System, 1992
B.Y.U. L. Rev. 669, 671.
28. See Bubany & Skillern, supra note 13, at 476-77 (noting the prosecutor's un-
controlled decision making power).
29. See id. at 476 (noting that the prosecutor "has the freedom to decide which
cases he will prosecute"); Vorenberg, supra note 24, at 1524-32 (criticizing broad
prosecutorial discretion in deciding whether to prosecute); James Vorenberg, Narrow-
ing the Discretion of Crimnal Justice Officials, 1976 Duke L.J. 651, 678 ("The prosecu-
tor's decision whether and what to charge is the broadest discretionary power in
criminal administration.").
30. See Bubany & Skillern, supra note 13, at 478 (describing prosecutor's power to
decline to charge a suspect with a crime).
19981
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ted the crime. 3' Other than a constitutional challenge by a criminal
defendant,32 there is very little process for review of these decisions.33
Some states require that felony charges be formally instituted by a
grand jury,34 but the grand jury process is controlled entirely by the
prosecutor.35 The grand jury can be as small as five members and as
large as about two dozen.36 Grand jurors hear the testimony of wit-
nesses, ask questions, and decide whether and with what offenses the
suspect should be charged.37 The prosecutor, however, usually de-
cides which witnesses will be called, directs the questioning of those
witnesses, interprets the law, and makes a recommendation to the
grand jury.3 8 Neither the target of the investigation nor his counsel
may be present during the grand jury proceedings,39 nor may they or
31. See 2 Wayne R. LaFave & Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure §§ 13.1(a), (e),
13.2(a) (1984); Charles H. Whitebread & Christopher Slobogin, Criminal Procedure
§ 21.01 (3d ed. 1993) (discussing dominant role of prosecutor in charging decision);
see also Tracey L. Meares, Rewards For Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial
Discretion and Conduct With Financial Incentives, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 851 (1995)
(proposing financial rewards to prosecutors who limit their charging and plea bargain-
ing discretion by charging only those defendants with offenses they believe they can
prove at trial).
32. See infra Part III (discussing selective prosecution challenges).
33. See Whitebread & Slobogin, supra note 31, § 23.06 (discussing weak checks on
prosecutor's discretion once there is sufficient evidence to prosecute).
34. The grand jury was originally conceived in the American colonies as a popular
check on the British government's power to prosecute. See Whitebread & Slobogin,
supra note 31, § 23.01. The Fifth Amendment's requirement of grand jury indictment
for a "capital, or otherwise infamous crime" was held by the Supreme Court not to be
essential to due process, and hence not applicable to the states through the Four-
teenth Amendment. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884).
Sixteen states require prosecution by grand jury indictment for all felonies. See
Whitebread & Slobogin, supra note 31, § 23.01 n.6. Up to thirty states allow felony
prosecutions to be brought by "information." A typical information procedure is to
require a magistrate's finding of probable cause following a preliminary examination.
The remaining states require prosecution by indictment only for capital offenses. See
id.
35. See Andrew D. Leipold, Why Grand Juries Do Not (And Cannot) Protect the
Accused, 80 Cornell L. Rev. 260,266 n.24 (1995); see also Vorenberg, supra note 24, at
1537-38 (discussing how grand jury proceedings are "orchestrated" by the
prosecutor).
36. See Whitebread & Slobogin, supra note 31, § 23.02(b).
37. See id. § 23.05; see also Amy Bushyeager & Maria N. Nikiforos, Twenty Sixth
Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: Grand Jury, 85 Geo. L.J. 1002, 1002-04, 1012-
13 (1997) (discussing size and power of grand juries in federal system).
38. See Whitebread & Slobogin, supra note 31, § 23.05(d) (discussing power of
prosecutor in grand jury proceedings).
39. See Bushyeager & Nikiforos, supra note 37, at 1020 (discussing grand jury se-
crecy). In order to protect the secrecy of the investigation, "few states give the target
of a grand jury investigation the right to appear before the grand jury." See White-
bread & Slobogin, supra note 31, § 23.04(a).
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any member of the general public be informed of the substance of the
witnesses' testimony or any other details of these proceedings."
The charging decision is one of the most important decisions a pros-
ecutor makes. In conjunction with the plea bargaining process," the
charging decision almost predetermines the outcome of a criminal
case,42 because the vast majority of criminal cases result in guilty pleas
or guilty verdicts.43 The charge also often determines the sentence
that the defendant will receive, particularly in federal court, where
criminal sentences are governed by the federal sentencing guide-
lines,' and in state cases involving mandatory sentences.45 Because
the sentencing guidelines and mandatory sentencing laws virtually
eliminate judicial discretion,46 the prosecutor often effectively deter-
mines the defendant's sentence at the charging stage of the process, if
the defendant is eventually found guilty.47 The charging decision's ef-
fect on the outcome of a case is felt to a lesser degree in state court.
Although some state courts have some form of sentencing guide-
40. See Mark Kadish, Behind the Locked Door of an American Grand Jury Its
History, Its Secrecy, and Its Process, 24 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1, 12-22 (1997) (examining
grand jury secrecy).
41. See infra notes 55-59 and accompanying text (discussing plea bargaining).
42. Cf. Vorenberg, supra note 24, at 1525-26 (discussing the impact of the charging
decision on a suspect's contact with the criminal justice system).
43. See 2 LaFave & Israel, supra note 31, § 20.1 (discussing preponderance of
cases resulting in guilty pleas).
44. See Lisa M. Farabee, Disparate Departures Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: A Tale of Two Districts, 30 Conn. L. Rev. 569 (1998) (analyzing federal
sentencing guidelines); Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of the Guide-
lines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 Yale Li. 1681, 1752-53
(1992) (criticizing the Guidelines' limiting of judicial discretion in sentencing);
Cynthia K.Y. Lee, A New "Sliding Scale of Deference" Approach to Abuse of Discre-
tion Appellate Review of District Court Departures Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 35 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1, 54 (1998) (arguing that appellate courts retain
considerable power to check district court departures from the Guidelines despite
Koon v. United States's purported reigning in of appellate courts' power of review).
45. "Three strikes" laws, a popular form of mandatory sentencing, require long
sentences for repeat offenders. For example, California's three strikes law imposes a
sentence of 25 years to life in prison for an offender convicted of a felony following
two prior convictions for serious crimes. Cal. Penal Code § 1170.1 (\est 1998). The
law also mandates doubling a sentence on the second "strike," requires consecutive
sentences for multiple counts, and limits "good time" credits. Id.: see Peter Green-
wood et al., Estimated Benefits and Costs of California's New Mandatory-Sentencing
Law, in Three Strikes and You're Out: Vengeance as Public Policy 53, 53-54 (David
Shichor & Dale K. Sechrest eds. 1996).
46. See Kate Stith & Jose A. Cabranes, Judging Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 91 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1247, 1254 (1997) (explaining how under the Guidelines
judges are "required to follow complex and abstract rules and to make minute arith-
metic calculations in order to arrive at a sentence").
47. See Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Plea Negotiations Under the Fed-
eral Sentencing Guidelines: Guidelines Circumvention and Its Dynamics in the Post-
Mistretta Period, 91 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1284, 1284 n.3 (1997) (discussing the claims of
many judges that the Guidelines have transferred sentencing discretion from the court
to the prosecutor).
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lines,48 most states give judges more discretion in determining the sen-
tence for a convicted defendant. Nonetheless, the range of penalties is
set by the initial charging decision.
The gravity of the charging decision is epitomized by a prosecutor's
decision to seek the death penalty. No state's laws require that the
death penalty be sought in any particular case,49 and all thirty-eight
states that currently provide for the death penalty5" leave the decision
to the discretion of the prosecutor.' Most state death penalty laws
allow the prosecutor to seek the death penalty in cases involving spe-
cific aggravating factors.52 The decision to seek the death penalty, like
all charging decisions, can only be challenged on constitutional
grounds,53 and these challenges are extremely difficult to sustain.5'
B. Plea Bargaining
Most criminal cases end in a guilty plea.55 The typical plea bargain
arrangement involves an agreement by the prosecutor to dismiss the
most serious charge or charges in exchange for the defendant's guilty
plea to a less serious offense. The defendant gives up his right to a
trial and avoids the possibility of being convicted of a more serious
offense and being imprisoned for a longer period of time.56 Some-
times, the plea bargain offers the possibility of avoiding imprisonment
entirely. Although the judge must approve plea bargains in most ju-
risdictions, judges routinely approve these agreements because they
48. See, e.g., id. at 1287 (discussing Minnesota's sentencing guidelines).
49. See Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Criminal Law § 2.14(f), at 178-79
(2d ed. 1986) (discussing a succession of Supreme Court cases striking down state
mandatory death penalty statutes as unconstitutional).
50. See Kimberly Woolley, Constitutional Interpretations of the Antiterrorism Act's
Habeas Corpus Provisions, 66 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 414, 433 (1998) (citing statistics).
51. See Thomas Johnson, When Prosecutors Seek the Death Penalty, 22 Am. J.
Crim. L. 280, 280 (1994).
52. See, e.g., LaFave & Scott, supra note 49, at 178 (discussing statutory scheme
upheld in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)).
53. See infra notes 190-201 and accompanying text for a discussion of McClesky v.
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (holding that a defendant must prove a Fourteenth
Amendment violation in his capital sentence by showing purposeful discrimination in
his case, not racial disparities in sentencing generally). A proposed Racial Justice Act
would permit defendants to challenge death sentences based on racial disparities, but
the legislation has never been passed by Congress. See Paul Schoeman, Note, Easing
the Fear of Too Much Justice: A Compromise Proposal to Revise the Racial Justice
Act, 30 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 543, 551-52 (1995).
54. For a discussion of legal challenges to discriminatory prosecutorial decisions,
see infra Part III.
55. See Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Getting to "Guilty": Plea Bargaining as Ne-
gotiation, 2 Harv. Negotiation L. Rev. 115, 117 n.7 (1997) (discussing studies showing
that as many as ninety percent of criminal cases end in guilty pleas).
56. See 2 LaFave & Israel, supra note 31, § 20.1 (discussing plea negotiation
system).
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expedite the process by disposing of criminal cases without the time
and expense of a trial.57
Like the charging decision, the plea bargaining process is controlled
entirely by the prosecutor and decisions are entirely within her discre-
tion. A criminal defendant cannot plead guilty to a less serious of-
fense unless the prosecutor decides to make a plea offer.5 While the
defense attorney may attempt to negotiate the best possible offer, the
decision is ultimately left to the prosecutor's discretion. 9
Although prosecutors make important, influential decisions at other
stages of the criminal process, the charging and plea bargaining stages
provide the most independent power and control and allow the least
opportunity for counterbalancing input from the defense. Prosecutors
do not control the trial stage of the process and defense attorneys are
theoretically on equal footing at this stage, as judges control the pace
and content of the trial through their rulings. The sentencing hearing
also provides for participation by the defense attorney and is con-
trolled by the judge, unless mandatory sentencing laws are involved.
In mandatory sentencing cases, which are increasingly common, the
prior charging and plea bargaining decisions of the prosecutor often
determine the sentence the defendant will receive, making the input
of the defense attorney and the judge almost irrelevant.
II. RACISM IN THE PROSECUTORIAL PROCESS
Because prosecutors are arguably the most powerful deci-
sionmakers in the process, their decisions potentially have the greatest
discriminatory impact. No discussion of the impact of prosecutorial
discretion on racial disparities in the criminal justice system would be
complete, however, without a discussion of the discretionary decisions
of police officers. Prosecutors typically do not become involved in a
criminal case unless and until a police officer makes an arrest.' If
race is a factor in the decision to arrest a suspect, the police officer has
57. In some jurisdictions, the judge participates in the plea negotiation process
and will inform the defendant what the sentence will be prior to the acceptance of the
plea. See 2 LaFave & Israel, supra note 31, § 20.3(d) (discussing judicial involvement
in plea negotiations in some jurisdictions).
58. See id. § 20.3(c) (discussing prosecutor's discretion to refuse to engage in plea
bargaining).
59. Of course, a defendant may choose to plead guilty to all charges without an
agreement to dismiss the most serious charge or charges, but typically there are no
advantages to choosing this option unless the defendant has reason to believe that the
judge will impose a lenient sentence in consideration of the guilty plea.
60. But see Peter J. Henning, Testing the Limits of Investigating and Prosecuting
White Collar Crime: How Far Will the Courts Allow Prosecutors to Go?, 54 U. Pitt. L
Rev. 405 (1993) (describing cases in the federal system in which prosecutors partici-
pate in the investigation of the case before an arrest is made); Lisa F. Salvatore,
United States v. Hammad: Encouraging Ethical Conduct of Prosecutors During Pre-
Indictment Investigations, 56 Brook. L. Rev. 577 (1990) (describing circumstances in
which prosecutors may participate in pre-indictment investigations).
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infused the process with a layer of racial discrimination even before
the prosecutor has an opportunity to exercise her discretion.6'
Racial impact studies in prosecutor offices may reveal racial dis-
paraties in law enforcement. These studies may demonstrate that po-
lice are arresting African Americans and presenting them for
prosecution at disproportionately higher rates than their similarly situ-
ated white counterparts. If such evidence is revealed, police should be
compelled to explain or remedy the disparities.6 The available litera-
ture suggests that such racial disparities frequently exist in the arrest
stage of the criminal process.63
A. Race and Police Discretion
Police officers often act in a discriminatory manner in the perform-
ance of their official duties when they disproportionately stop, detain,
and arrest African American men,' with or without probable cause,
61. See Poulin, supra note 25, at 1084 ("If the police improperly exercise their
discretion, the initial discrimination skews the decision to prosecute even if the prose-
cutor later culls out some of the referred cases.").
62. For a discussion of the effect of racial impact studies on police, see infra Part
V.D.
63. See Noryal Morris, Race and Crime: What Evidence is There that Race Influ-
ences Results in the Criminal Justice System?, 72 Judicature 111, 112 (1988); Joseph F.
Sheley, Structural Influences on the Problem of Race, Crime, and Criminal Justice Dis-
crimination, 67 Tul. L. Rev. 2273, 2275-76 (1993); Alan J. Tomkins et al., Subtle Dis-
crimination in Juvenile Justice Decisionmaking: Social Scientific Perspectives and
Explanations, 29 Creighton L. Rev. 1619, 1632 (1996).
64. See generally Brief for Petitioners at 23-27, Whren v. United States, 517 U.S.
806 (1996) (No. 95-5841) (discussing both statistical and anecdotal evidence of dispro-
portionate police stops of African American men); Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops, and
Traffic Stops, 51 U. Miami L. Rev. 425, 427 (1997) [hereinafter Davis, Race, Cops, and
Traffic Stops] (arguing that Whren leaves victims of pretextual traffic stops without a
viable legal remedy); David A. Harris, "Driving While Black" and All Other Traffic
Offenses: The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. Crim. L. & Criminol-
ogy 544, 546 (1997) [hereinafter Harris, Driving While Black] (arguing that Whren put
the Court's imprimatur on longstanding police practice of stopping African American
drivers "just to see what officers can find."); David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable
Suspicion: When Black and Poor Means Stopped and Frisked, 69 Ind. L.J. 659 (1994)
[hereinafter Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion] (arguing that a substantial body
of law now allows police officers to stop an individual based on presence in a high
crime area and evasive behavior-two factors which affect African Americans and
Latinos more frequently than whites); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race and the Decision to
Detain a Suspect, 93 Yale L.J. 214, 214 (1983) (discussing the impact of race on police
stops and detentions).
For examples of discriminatory stops, see Michael A. Fletcher, Driven to Extremes,
Wash. Post, Mar. 29, 1996, at Al. For statistical analyses of police decisions to stop
motorists, see Jeff Brazil & Steve Berry, Color of Driver is Key to Stops in 1-95 Videos,
Orlando Sentinel Trib., Aug. 23, 1992, at Al; Paul Butler, Encounters with the Police
on my Street, Legal Times, Nov. 10, 1997, at 23; Henry Pierson Curtis, Statistics Show
Pattern of Discrimination, Orlando Sentinel Trib., Aug. 23, 1992, at All; John Lam-
berth, Driving While Black, Wash. Post, Aug. 16, 1998, at Cl; Paul W. Valentine, Md.
State Police Still Target Black Motorists, ACLU Says, Wash. Post, Nov. 15, 1996, at Al.
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and with or without articulable suspicion.6" In fact, courts have up-
held race as a legitimate factor in the decision to stop and detain a
suspect.
66
One factor that contributes to discrimination at the arrest stage is
the discretion afforded police officers in deciding who to stop and
whether to make an arrest. Despite the requirement that a police of-
ficer's decision to stop a suspect must be based on an articulable suspi-
cion,67 the Supreme Court has shown increasing deference to the
judgment of police officers in its interpretation of this requirement.68
The practical effect of this deference is the assimilation of police of-
ficers' subjective beliefs, biases, hunches, and prejudices into law. 69
Because police officers are not required to make an arrest when they
observe conduct creating probable cause,70 their discretion may result
in the failure to detain or arrest whites who commit acts for which
their African American counterparts would often be detained or
arrested.7'
65. A police officer may stop and frisk suspects without probable cause if he has a
reasonable and articulable suspicion that "criminal activity may be afoot and that the
persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous." Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). The Court has defined reasonable suspicion as "specific
and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,
reasonably warrant that intrusion." Id. at 21. Police officers may arrest suspects for a
felony offense in a public place without a warrant if they have probable cause to
believe a crime has been committed. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 421-23
(1976). If the crime is a misdemeanor, the officer may make an arrest only if the
crime was committed in her presence. Id. at 422.
66. See United States v. Weaver, 966 F.2d 391, 392 (8th Cir. 1992) (explaining that
factors that created reasonable suspicion included fact that defendant was a "'roughly
dressed' young black male"); see also United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873,
886-87 (1975) (stating that a person's "Mexican appearance" in an area near the U.S.-
Mexico border is a relevant factor in creating reasonable suspicion that the person is
an illegal alien, but "standing alone it does not justify stopping all Mexican-Americans
to ask if they are aliens"); United States v. Harvey, 16 F.3d 109, 113 (6th Cir. 1994)
(Keith, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority upheld a pretextual traffic stop despite
the police officer's admission that he was motivated to make stop based on fact that
"[tihere were three young black male occupants in an old vehicle").
67. See supra note 65.
68. See Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion, supra note 64, at 660-69 (1994)
(suggesting that the Court has relaxed the Terry standard in deference to law enforce-
ment concerns).
69. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 242 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing) ("The majority's fear of overruling the 'quick ad hoc judgment' of the police
officer is thus inconsistent with the very function of the [Fourth] Amendment-to
ensure that the quick ad hoc judgments of police officers are subject to review and
control by the judiciary.").
70. Practically speaking, a police officer's decision not to stop, detain, or arrest is
unreviewable. See Stephen A. Saltzburg & Daniel J. Capra, American Criminal Pro-
cedure 681 (5th ed. 1996).
71. See Courtland Milloy, Unequal Justice in P.G.?, Wash. Post, Feb. 25, 1996, at
B1 (describing an event in Prince George's County, Maryland, where white officers
observed three white adults smoking crack cocaine in a car with a baby and neither
made arrests nor filed charges).
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Police officers engage in discriminatory conduct in numerous fo-
rums. Traffic stops provide a particularly egregious example. Police
officers use alleged traffic violations as an excuse for stopping and de-
taining motorists they suspect of other criminal conduct. Once the
driver is stopped, the police officer will use the opportunity to observe
the interior of the car for any items that might be in "plain view. '"72
The officer may also obtain the consent of an intimidated driver to
conduct a full search of the car.73 Even if the driver refuses to give the
officer consent to search the car, the police officer often may arrest
the driver, rather than simply issue a citation, as long as there is prob-
able cause to believe that a traffic violation has been committed.7 4
72. The criteria that generally guide "plain view" searches are set forth in Coo-
lidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
It is well established that under certain circumstances the police may seize
evidence in plain view without a warrant ....
What the 'plain view' cases have in common is that the police officer in
each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which
he came ... across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doc-
trine serves to supplement the prior justification [for conducting a search or
seizure]-whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search inci-
dent to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present un-
connected with a search directed against the accused-and permits the
warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification is
legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have
evidence before them; the 'plain view' doctrine may not be used to extend a
general exploratory search from one object to another until something in-
criminating at last emerges.
Id. at 465-66. The Court removed the requirement that evidence seized in plain view
be discovered inadvertently in Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 139-42 (1990).
73. A traffic stop gives a police officer the opportunity to request permission to
search a person's car. The police officer may legally request such permission to
search, whether or not he decides to issue a traffic ticket. Although the officer must
have reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop or arrest a motorist, once the
reason for the stop or arrest is completed, the officer has the right to continue to
speak with him. Even if a police officer does not have probable cause or reasonable
suspicion to believe that a crime has been or is about to be committed, he nonetheless
has the right to approach an individual and speak with him. See Florida v. Bostick, 501
U.S. 429 (1991). The Supreme Court has held that if the individual does not want to
talk to the officer, he has the right to decline and walk away, and the exercise of those
rights may not be used as the sole basis for probable cause or even reasonable suspi-
cion. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-98 (1983). But police need not necessar-
ily inform a person of his right to refuse to consent to a search. See Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973). Nor must police inform "a lawfully seized
defendant ... that he is free to go before his consent to [a] search will be ... recog-
nized as voluntary." Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 35 (1996).
74. See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 248 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In Robinson, the de-
fendant was arrested pursuant to a regulation that required the arrest of a person
operating a motor vehicle after revocation of an operator's permit. Justice Marshall
wrote in dissent:
Although, in this particular case, Officer Jenks was required by police de-
partment regulations to make an in-custody arrest rather than to issue a cita-
tion, in most jurisdictions and for most traffic offenses the determination of
whether to issue a citation or effect a full arrest is discretionary with the
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Once an arrest is made, the officer is justified in conducting a full-
fledged search of the person and the surrounding area.7 Police of-
ficers may use minor traffic violations as an excuse to stop individuals
they would otherwise have no legitimate reason to detain. These so-
called "pretextual stops" allow police officers to use any traffic viola-
tion, no matter how minor, as a justification for a stop and possible
arrest.76 Because police officers do not stop motorists every time they
officer. There is always the possibility that a police officer, lacking probable
cause to obtain a search warrant, will use a traffic arrest as a pretext to con-
duct a search.
l (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 266 (1973)
(holding that a police officer may search a subject's person incident to a lawful arrest).
In Gustafson, the police officer was not required by regulation to make a custodial
arrest. Id. at 263. Justice Stewart wrote in concurrence: "It seems to me that a per-
suasive claim might have been made in this case that the custodial arrest of the peti-
tioner for a minor traffic offense violated his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments. But no such claim has been made." Id. at 266-67 (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
75. If the police officer decides to place the motorist under arrest, he then has the
legal authority to conduct a full-blown search incident to the arrest of the motorist
and the area around him. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981); Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969). Any evidence or contraband found on the
motorist may be used as the basis for probable cause to arrest him for other crimes.
See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812-14 (1996); Robinson, 414 U.S. at 266.
76. The Supreme Court has held that a police officer may stop a vehicle if he has
probable cause to believe a traffic violation has occurred, even if the officer uses the
traffic stop as a pretext to investigate suspicion of criminal activity not supported by
probable cause. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 812-14. In criticizing the standard for pretex-
tual stops adopted in Whren, one court has noted: "Given the 'multitude of applica-
ble traffic and equipment regulations' in any jurisdiction, upholding a stop on the
basis of a regulation seldom enforced opens the door to . .. arbitrary exercise of
police discretion . . . ." United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 790 (10th Cir.
1995) (Seymour, CJ., dissenting) (citation omitted). LaFave notes that the Whren
standard has "conferred upon the police virtual carte blanche to stop people because
of the color of their skin or for any other arbitrary reason." 1 Wayne R. LaFave,
Search & Seizure § 1.4(e), at 123 (3d ed. 1996) (footnote omitted). He also states
that:
[G]iven the pervasiveness of ... minor offenses and the ease with which law
enforcement agents may uncover them in the conduct of virtually everyone
... there exists "a power that places the liberty of every man in the hands of
every petty officer," precisely the kind of arbitrary authority which gave rise
to the Fourth Amendment.
Id. § 1.4(e), at 121-22. For frank admissions by police of how they use traffic viola-
tions as a pretext to investigate hunches not supported by reasonable suspicion, see
Brief for Petitioners at 21, Whren (No. 95-5841).
For examples of pretextual stops upheld by courts under the standard endorsed by
Whren, see United States v. Harvey, 16 F.3d 109, 113 (6th Cir. 1994) (upholding a stop
in which the arresting officer testified that he stopped the car in part because "[t]here
were three young black male occupants in an old vehicle") (Keith, J., dissenting); and
United States v. Roberson, 6 F.3d 1088, 1092 (5th Cir. 1993) (upholding a stop in which
a state trooper known "for patrolling the [F]ourth [A]mendment's outer frontier"
stopped a vehicle with black occupants for changing lanes without signaling on an
open stretch of highway). Whren invalidated cases holding that a traffic stop passed
Fourth Amendment scrutiny only if a reasonable officer would have made the stop.
517 U.S. at 339. Such cases include United States v. Laymon, 730 F. Supp. 332 (D.
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observe a traffic violation," the stops can be used in a discriminatory
manner.7 8 The Supreme Court has unanimously upheld the constitu-
tionality of pretextual stops, 79 despite studies showing that they are
disproportionately used to stop and detain African Americans and
Latinos.8 °
The racial impact of discretionary arrest decisions is particularly sig-
nificant for drug offenses. Although whites use drugs in far greater
numbers than African Americans, 81 African Americans comprise a
disproportionate percentage of drug arrests, convictions, and impris-
onments.82 Law enforcement agents concede that drugs are used and
sold in middle and upper class neighborhoods and business districts,83
but they have focused their law enforcement efforts in urban and in-
ner-city areas which are populated primarily by African Americans
and other people of color. These decisions have obvious racial
effects.
Colo. 1990), where an undercover officer followed a car because it had out-of-state
plates. waiting for the vehicle to commit a traffic infraction. Whren, 517 U.S. at 339.
When the car's right tire finally touched the white shoulder stripe, the officer pulled
the car over for "weaving." Id. at 333. Using the test of whether a reasonable officer
would have made the stop, Laymon held the stop unreasonable. Id. Under Whren,
such a stop is perfectly legal. Id. at 339.
77. For example, 70-80 percent of motorists exceed the posted speed limit on in-
terstate highways, yet police observe a "traditional five mph enforcement 'tolerance'
in most states." See Brief for Petitioners at 19, Whren (No. 95-5841) (citing U.S. Dept.
of Transportation statistics).
78. For a discussion of the discriminatory nature of pretextual traffic stops, see
Harris, Driving While Black, supra note 64, which argues that Whren approves racially
discriminatory traffic stops. See also Davis, Race, Cops and Traffic Stops, supra note
64 (arguing that Whren left people of color without an adequate remedy for discrimi-
natory police stops).
79. See supra note 76.
80. There are numerous other examples of the disproportionate use of pretextual
traffic stops against African Americans. Several class-action lawsuits filed by black
motorists against city and county officials have resulted in out-of-court settlements
requiring monitoring of police traffic stops. See Russell, supra note 10, at 40-43 (dis-
cussing lawsuits). Discovery materials in many cases reveal that police often are
shameless in their use of pretextual stops to target black motorists. See Brief for Peti-
tioners at 25-29, Whren (No. 95-5841) (discussing discovery materials); see also Harris,
Driving While Black, supra note 64 (discussing cases which document the use of
pretextual traffic stops against African Americans and Latinos).
81. Although African Americans comprise only 13% of drug users, they make up
35% of those arrested for drug possession, 55% of those convicted of drug possession,
and 74% of those imprisoned for drug possession. See Mauer & Huling, supra note 11,
at 12 (discussing statistics).
82. See id.
83. United States Sentencing Commission, Special Report to Congress: Cocaine
and Federal Sentencing Policy 70 (1995) [hereinafter Sentencing Commission].
84. Law enforcement officials cite reasons other than race for this focus on making
arrests in urban areas. See Tonry, supra note 10, at 106 (noting that some law enforce-
ment officials have cited the ease of infiltrating and making arrests in the visible, open
air drug markets of urban areas as compared to drug use and trafficking in more
affluent areas); see also Sentencing Commission, supra note 83, at 70 ("Although
there is a reasonably clear idea of who sells cocaine in the street and in crack and
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B. Race and Prosecutorial Discretion
Although some prosecutors are involved in the investigatory stage
of the criminal process, most prosecutors enter the process after an
arrest is made.85 A prosecutor may not know about racial considera-
tions in the arrest process, and in most instances, does not have juris-
diction or control over the police department or other law
enforcement agencies.8 6 If a prosecutor is aware of the inappropriate
or illegal consideration of race at the arrest stage of the process, she
may legitimately decide to exercise her discretion to decline prosecu-
tion. The consideration of race in the arrest process is usually not
obvious, however, and unless a prosecutor were intentionally attempt-
ing to ferret out such decisions, she may not discover them. Addition-
ally, because prosecutors must rely on police officers to prosecute
their cases successfully, they are not motivated to confront them with
accusations of racism and discrimination.
Prosecutors should bear the brunt of the remedial responsibility to
eliminate racism in the criminal process, even though inappropriate or
illegal considerations of race may occur at the arrest stage, often
before prosecutorial participation in the process. The Supreme
Court's decision in Whren v. United States' has created the same kind
of constitutional hurdles in cases involving police officers as Arm-
strong v. United States has created in selective prosecution cases-
namely, the virtual impossibility of proving intentional discrimination
based on race.' Police officers, however, have less power and oppor-
tunity than prosecutors to move beyond constitutional limitations.
Although police officers may and should take steps to discover and
eliminate the inappropriate consideration of race,", their power to af-
fect and influence the criminal process begins and ends at the arrest
stage. Prosecutorial power affects every stage of the process, including
the arrest stage.90
shooting houses, there is less awareness of how cocaine is sold in the suburbs, in up-
per-class neighborhoods, and to business people."). For discussion of debate about
whether or not this focus on law enforcement in communities of color is harmful, see
infra Part V.D.2.
85. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
86. See Melilli, supra note 27, at 676 ("[P]olice decisions not to investigate or not
to arrest will ordinarily receive no review by the prosecutor's office."); see also supra
note 76 and accompanying text (describing lack of judicial review of pretextual traffic
stops made by police officers).
87. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
88. See infra notes 171-85 and accompanying text.
89. See Sean Hecker, Race and Pretextual Traffic Stops: An Erpanded Role for
Civilian Review Boards, 28 Colum. Hum. Rts. L Rev. 551, 561-62 (1997) (discussing
agreement by Maryland State Police not to use racial profiles in drug enforcement,
which was part of a settlement of a suit brought by African American motorist who
was illegally detained because of his race).
90. Two legal scholars noted:
The decisions [the prosecutor] makes influence and often determine the dis-
position in all cases brought to him by the police. The prosecutor's decisions
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Like police officers, prosecutors often make decisions that discrimi-
nate against African American victims and defendants. 91 These deci-
sions may or may not be intentional or conscious. Although it may be
difficult to prove intentional discrimination when it exists, uninten-
tional discrimination poses even greater challenges. Prosecutors may
not be aware that the seemingly harmless, reasonable, race-neutral de-
cisions they make every day may have a racially discriminatory im-
pact. This discriminatory impact may occur because of unconscious
racism-a phenomenon that plays a powerful role in so many discre-
tionary decisions in the criminal process-and because the lack of
power and disadvantaged circumstances of so many African American
defendants and victims make it more likely that prosecutors will treat
them less well than whites.
1. Unconscious Racism
If one acknowledges that African Americans experience both dispa-
rate and discriminatory treatment in the criminal justice system, 92 the
discussion ultimately turns to the issue of blame. Whose fault is it?
Who has committed the invidious act or acts that have caused African
also significantly affect the arrest practices of the police, the volume of cases
in the courts, and the number of offenders referred to the correctional sys-
tem. Thus, the prosecutor is in the most favorable position to bring about
needed coordination among the various law enforcement and correctional
agencies in the community.
Charles W. Thomas & W. Anthony Fitch, Prosecutorial Decision Making, 13 Am.
Crim. L. Rev. 507, 509 n.14 (1976) (quoting President's Commission on Law Enforce-
ment and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: The Courts 72 (1967)); see
also Paul Butler, The Home Front: Eric Holder's Reefer Madness, Legal Times, Jan.
20, 1997, at 25 (criticizing how U.S. Attorney Eric H. Holder, Jr. "has directed his
assistants to vigorously prosecute people who possess small amounts of marijuana");
Philip P. Pan & Robert E. Pierre, For Police, a Dead End: D.C., Pr. George's Have
This in Common: Too Many Homicides, Wash. Post, Jan. 12, 1997, at B1 (discussing
how former D.C. U.S. Attorney Eric H. Holder, Jr.'s new get tough policy of prose-
cuting cases involving any amount of marijuana has led police to stricter enforcement
of marijuana laws and increased arrests); Robert E. Pierre, Marijuana's Violent Side:
As Use of Drug Rises, So Do Slayings in D.C., Wash. Post, Sept. 9, 1996, at A1 (dis-
cussing how U.S. Attorney Eric H. Holder, Jr. is "considering not only prosecuting
more marijuana cases but also asking the D.C., Council to enact stiffer penalties for
the sale and use of marijuana").
91. See William Bowers et al., Legal Homicide: Death as Punishment in America
1864-1982 (1980); Developments in the Law: Race and the Criminal Process, 101
Harv. L. Rev. 1472, 1525 (1988) [hereinafter Developments in the Law]; Larry Michael
Fehr, Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Prosecution and Sentencing: Empirical Re-
search of the Washington State Minority and Justice Commission, 32 Gonz. L. Rev.
577, 581-86 (1997); Gary D. LaFree, The Effect of Sexual Stratification by Race on
Official Reactions to Rape, 45 Am. Soc. Rev. 842, 852-53 (1990); Michael L. Radelet &
Glenn L. Pierce, Race and Prosecutorial Discretion in Homicide Cases, 19 L. & Soc'y
Rev. 587, 615-19 (1985); Cassia Spohn et al., The Impact of Ethnicity and Gender of
Defendants on the Decision to Reject or Dismiss Felony Charges, 25 Criminology 175
(1987).
92. For the distinction between disparate and discriminatory treatment, see infra
Part III.B.
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Americans to experience this discriminatory treatment? It is this in-
tent-focused analysis, sanctioned by the Supreme Court in its equal
protection analysis,93 that has stymied legal challenges to discrimina-
tion in the criminal context.94 Instead of focusing on the harm exper-
ienced by African Americans as a result of actions by state actors, the
Court has focused on whether the act itself is inherently invidious and
whether the actor intended to cause the harm.9" In addition, the
Court has placed the burden of proving intent on the shoulders of the
victim.9 6 If the victim is unable to prove the actor's bad intent or, in
certain contexts, if the actor can establish a nondiscriminatory expla-
nation for his behavior,97 the Court offers no remedy for the harm
experienced by the victim.
The main problem with this intent-focused analysis is that it is back-
ward-looking. Although perhaps adequate in combating straightfor-
ward and explicit discrimination as it existed in the past, it is totally
deficient as a remedy for the more complex and systemic discrimina-
tion that African Americans currently experience. When state actors
openly expressed their racist views, it was easy to identify and label
the invidious nature of their actions.98 But today, with some notable
exceptions, 99 most racist behavior is not openly expressed. More sig-
nificantly, some racist behavior is committed unconsciously,"m and
many who engage in this behavior are well-intentioned people who
would be appalled by the notion that they would be seen as behaving
in a racist or discriminatory manner.
Unconscious racism, although arguably less offensive than pur-
poseful discrimination, is no less harmful. In fact, in many ways it is
more perilous because it is often unrecognizable to the victim as well
93. For a discussion of the equal protection analysis, see infra Part III.A-B.
94. For a discussion of the inadequacy of current legal remedies for discriminatory
prosecutorial behavior, see infra Part III.
95. See infra Part III.
96. See infra Part III.
97. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that a prosecutor must
establish a race-neutral reason for using a peremptory strike against African Ameri-
can member of jury pool).
98. A good example is the blatant racism in the Scottsboro Boys case. See Dan T.
Carter, Scottsboro: A Tragedy of the American South (rev. ed. 1979); James Good-
man, Stories of Scottsboro (1994); see also infra Part III (discussing Yick Wo v. Hop-
kins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)).
99. See, e.g., Jim Newton & Bill Boyarsky, Witnesses Tell Jury of Fuhrman's Racial
Epithets, L.A. Times, Sept. 6, 1995, at Al (describing witnesses' accounts of racial
epithets by police officer who was the key witness in OJ. Simpson's murder trial).
100. See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Unconscious Racism and the Criminal Law, 73 Cor-
nell L. Rev. 1016 (1988) (exploring unconscious racism in criminal law decisions);
Naomi Wolf, The Racism of Well-Meaning White People, in Skin Deep: Black Women
and White Women Write About Race 37 (Marita Golden & Susan Richards Shreve,
eds., 1995); Edward Patrick Boyle, Note, It's Not Easy Bein' Green: The Psychology
of Racismn, Environmental Discrimination, and the Argiunent for Modernizing Equal
Protection Analysis, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 937, 939 (1993) (describing unconscious or
"aversive" racism).
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as the perpetrator. And the Court, by focusing on intent rather than
harm, has refused to recognize, much less provide a remedy for, this
most common and widespread form of racism."' By focusing on
blame rather than injury, the Court serves to satisfy the psychological
needs of the uninjured party while leaving the victim without relief.
Professor Charles Lawrence defines unconscious racism as the
ideas, attitudes, and beliefs developed in American historical and cul-
tural heritage that cause Americans unconsciously to "attach signifi-
cance to an individual's race and [which] induce negative feelings and
opinions about nonwhites.""1 2 He argues that, although America's
historical experience has made racism an integral part of our culture,
most people exclude it from their conscious minds because it is re-
jected as immoral. 10 3 Professor Lawrence's definition of unconscious
racism provides a useful framework in which to examine the discrimi-
natory impact of prosecutorial decisionmaking.
2. The Discriminatory Impact of Race-Neutral Prosecutorial
Decisionmaking
Most prosecutors today would vehemently deny that they have ever
discriminated against African American defendants or victims or that
they take race into account in any way in the exercise of their
prosecutorial duties. Prosecutors exercise a tremendous amount of
discretion without governing rules and regulations and are not legally
required to exercise their discretion in any particular way. 10 4 None-
theless, many prosecutors informally consider nonracial factors in
making charging and plea bargaining decisions.' 05 Factors that prose-
cutors frequently cite as reasons for making certain charging and plea
bargaining decisions are: the seriousness of the offense, the defend-
ant's prior criminal record, the victim's interest in prosecution, the
strength of the evidence, the likelihood of conviction, and the availa-
101. But see infra notes 170-71 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Brennan's
dissent in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), and Justice Marshall's concur-
rence in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)).
102. Charles H. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317, 322 (1987).
103. See id. at 322-23.
104. William T. Pizzi, Understanding Prosecutorial Discretion in the United States:
The Limits of Comparative Criminal Procedure as an Instrument of Reform, 54 Ohio
St. L.J. 1325, 1344 (1993) (describing informal guidelines and standards within prose-
cutors offices).
105. The Department of Justice Manual states that "[t]he U.S. Attorney is author-
ized to decline prosecution in any case referred directly to him/her by an agency un-
less a statute provides otherwise. Whenever a case is closed without prosecution, the
U.S. Attorney's files should reflect the action taken and the reason for it." Depart-
ment of Justice Manual § 9-2.020 (1993-94 Supp.). The manual also has more detailed
guidelines on when to conduct a federal prosecution after a defendant has been ac-
quitted in a state court. See id. § 9-2.142.
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bility of alternative dispositions. 10 6 These otherwise legitimate, race-
neutral factors may be permeated with unconscious racism.
The seriousness of the offense is certainly a legitimate factor in
making a charging decision. A prosecutor may decide to dismiss a
case involving the possession of a single marijuana cigarette while
charging and vigorously prosecuting a case involving distribution of a
large amount of cocaine. Few would question this decision regardless
of the race of the defendants. The more difficult issue arises when two
cases involving the same offense but defendants or victims of different
races are charged differently. If two murder cases involving similar
facts with victims of different races are charged differently, the issue of
unconscious racism becomes relevant. If a defendant in a case involv-
ing a white victim is charged with capital murder while a defendant in
a similar case involving a black victim is charged with second-degree
murder, questions arise about the value the prosecutors unconsciously
placed on the lives of the respective victims.10 7 A prosecutor may un-
consciously consider a case involving a white victim as more serious
than a case involving a black victim.Y' s This unconscious view may
influence not only the charging decision, but related decisions as well.
106. These factors are frequently noted informally in plea negotiations and less fre-
quently in defense of legal challenges alleging discriminatory prosecutorial behavior.
See Developments in the Law, supra note 91, at 1523; see also infra Part III (discussing
legal challenges to discriminatory prosecutorial decisions). Prosecutors are not rou-
tinely required to justify or give reasons for charging or other discretionary decisions.
See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (-[T]he decision to prosecute is
particularly il-suited to judicial review."); Vorenberg, supra note 24, at 1542 (arguing
that task of showing discrimination by prosecutor is made more difficult by lack of
requirement to state reasons for charging decision). But see Wash. Rev. Code Ann.
§§ 9.94A.430-460 (West 1998) (setting forth statutory filing and disposition standards
to guide prosecutorial discretion in charging and plea bargaining decisions). See gen-
erally Michelle A. Gail, Tiventy-Sith Annual Review of Criminal Procedure:
Prosecutorial Discretion, 85 Geo. L.J. 983 (1997) (describing breadth of prosecutorial
discretion). Washington is the only state with such guidelines. See Fehr, supra note 91,
at 581. The guidelines are voluntary and do not create enforceable legal rights. Id.
107. See infra notes 188-94 and accompanying text for discussion of the Baldus
study which proved that murder cases in the state of Georgia from 1973-79 involving
white victims were three to four times more likely to be prosecuted as death penalty
cases than cases involving black victims. See also Kennedy, supra note 10, at 331 nn.51
& 52 (discussing the Baldus study and others showing race disparities in capital sen-
tencing); Developments in the Law, supra note 91, at 1525-27 (discussing studies show-
ing discrimination in prosecutor's charging decision based on race of victim and race
of offender); Radelet & Pierce, supra note 91 (discussing relationships between
prosecutorial classifications and victims' and defendants' race): Saundra Torry, ABA
Endorses Moratoriun on Capital Punishment, Wash. Post, Feb. 2. 1997, at A4 (dis-
cussing the ABA call for a moratorium on the death penalty until more study is done
on role of race and economics in capital sentencing). See generally Stephen L Carter,
When Victims Happen to Be Black, 97 Yale LJ. 420 (1988) (discussing assumptions
about race in the public's perception of victims and victimizers).
108. See Radelet & Pierce, supra note 91, at 616 ("[Rlegardless of the race of the
defendant[s], prosecutors may consider white victims more credible than black victims
or their troubles more worthy of full prosecution." (citing Martha A. Myers and John
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For example, if a prosecutor deems a particular case to be more
serious than others, she will tend to invest more time and resources in
that case, both investigating and preparing for trial. Such an increased
investment would consequently yield more evidence and stiffen
prosecutorial resolve. The likelihood of conviction is also obviously
increased by the additional investment in investigation. Thus,
although the strength of the evidence and the likelihood of conviction
are facially race-neutral factors, they may be influenced by an uncon-
sciously racist valuation of a case involving a white victim. 0 9
The victim's interest in prosecution is another legitimate factor that
prosecutors consider in making charging and plea bargaining deci-
sions. If the victim of a crime informs the prosecutor that he has no
interest in the prosecution of his case and no desire to see the defend-
ant punished, the prosecutor may legitimately dismiss the case based
on the victim's feelings, especially if she believes that the defendant
does not pose a danger to society and there are no other legitimate
reasons for pursuing the prosecution. Few would question this deci-
sion, especially if the victim of the crime considered the prosecution
process too onerous and difficult.
On the other hand, should a prosecutor pursue a prosecution in a
case that she would otherwise dismiss for legitimate reasons simply
because the victim wants to see the defendant punished? Or should a
prosecutor assume that a victim is not interested in prosecution when
the victim does not appear for witness conferences or respond to a
subpoena? These questions demonstrate the significance of the inter-
section of class and race in the criminal process.110 They also raise
fundamental questions about the duty and responsibility of the prose-
cutor to seek justice for all parties-defendants as well as victims-
and to assure that all parties receive equal protection under the law.
The prior record of the defendant is another legitimate, seemingly
race-neutral factor considered by prosecutors in the charging/plea bar-
gaining process. Defendants with prior records are more likely to be
charged and less likely to receive a favorable plea offer. Prosecutors
consider both arrest and conviction records; defendants with recidivist
tendencies are arguably more deserving of prosecution. Race, how-
ever, may affect the existence of a prior criminal record even in the
absence of recidivist tendencies on the part of the suspect.
Hagan, Private and Public Trouble: Prosecutors and the Allocation of Court Re-
sources, 26 Soc. Probs. 439, 447 (1979))).
109. See supra note 103.
110. Although the economic status of offenders and victims may appear to be the
determinative factor in these decisions, because the African American population is
disproportionately poor, any class-based discussion inevitably entails a discussion of
race. Moreover, if the behavior is unintentional and unconscious, it is difficult to
discern whether it is based on class, race, or both. See supra note 10.
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As previously noted, race plays a role in the decision to detain and/
or arrest a suspect."' Some courts have even legitimized this prac-
tice.112 In addition, policy decisions about where police officers
should be deployed and what offenses they should investigate have
racial ramifications." 3 The fact that a white defendant has no crimi-
nal arrest or conviction record may not be a reflection of a lack of
criminality on his part. If he lives in a neighborhood or attends a
school that resolves certain criminal offenses (drug use, assault, etc.)
without police intervention, he may be a recidivist without a record.
Likewise, a black defendant who lives in a designated "high crime"
area may have been detained and arrested on numerous occasions
with or without probable cause." 4 Thus, the existence or nonexis-
tence of an arrest or conviction record may or may not reflect relative
criminality in black and white defendants. A prosecutor without
knowledge of or sensitivity to this issue may give prior arrests undue
consideration in making charging and plea bargaining decisions.
Another factor that prosecutors sometimes consider is the availabil-
ity of alternative dispositions. For some less serious offenses, prosecu-
tors may be willing to consider dismissing a case based on the
existence of alternative resolutions that serve the overall interest of
justice. For example, if a defendant who has stolen is able to make
restitution and the victim is satisfied with this resolution and would be
burdened by numerous court appearances, dismissal of the case may
be the best disposition for all parties. The dismissal would also have
the added benefit of eliminating the time and expense of trying an-
other case for the prosecutor, the defense attorney, and the court. As
with all of the otherwise legitimate considerations, however, this issue
also has class and racial ramifications.
The murder case discussed in the introduction to this article demon-
strates the complexity of these issues. There is no way of determining
whether the prosecutor in Mr. McKnight's case considered any of the
traditional nonracial factors in deciding not to vigorously prosecute
this murder case, or if he did, which factors he considered. 5 Even if
he did consider these factors, his decisions unconsciously may have
been influenced by race.
The seriousness of the alleged offense-murder-would urge prose-
cution. The defendant had no prior record. In a murder case this fac-
tor would, at best, suggest leniency in sentencing or a favorable plea
bargain, not total dismissal of the case. As far as the victim's interest
was concerned, Mr. Nguyen had no relatives in the District of Colum-
bia willing or able to lobby the prosecutor to vigorously prosecute the
111. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
112. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
113. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
115. See supra Introduction.
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case, nor did the prosecutor seek to locate interested family members.
Although the strength of the government's case was unclear, the pros-
ecutor's failure to actively investigate the case certainly would have
contributed to any weaknesses in the government's evidence and, con-
sequently, the likelihood of conviction.
The prosecutor would probably deny that race or class had anything
to do with the decisions made in McKnight's case. His unconscious
racial biases, however, may have played a significant role in the pro-
cess. It is doubtful that the white male prosecutor empathized with
the middle-aged Vietnamese immigrant; it is likely that he would iden-
tify with the defendant who was a white male college student. In the
absence of family members or others to advocate on his behalf, Mr.
Nguyen was almost invisible-a foreign person of color whose life had
little or no value."16
Mr. McKnight's case illustrates how the discretionary decisions of
prosecutors affect both offenders and victims in the criminal process.
Although the prosecutor may not act invidiously, the discriminatory
effects of his unconscious, race-neutral decisions may harm both vic-
tims and offenders.' 17 Current legal remedies are totally inadequate
to address this harm.
III. LEGAL CHALLENGES TO DISCRIMINATORY PROSECUTORIAL
DECISIONS
It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, for either victims of crime
or criminal defendants to sustain legal challenges to the type of discre-
tionary decisions described in the previous section. First, prosecutors
ordinarily are not required to justify their discretionary decisions,
either orally or in writing." s Second, even if such records were volun-
116. Justice Brennan's dissent in McCleskey v. Kemp discusses this valuation of
human beings in the context of the decision to seek the death penalty:
Decisions influenced by race rest in part on a categorical assessment of the
worth of human beings according to color, insensitive to whatever qualities
the individuals in question may possess. Enhanced willingness to impose the
death sentence on black defendants, or diminished willingness to render
such a sentence when blacks are victims, reflects a devaluation of the lives of
black persons.
481 U.S. 279, 336 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
117. As one scholar notes:
The prosecutor's freedom from client control gives rise to vast discretion.
That, in turn, creates a risk that prejudice or self-interest will govern her
decisions. She may arbitrarily favor one defendant, or type of defendant,
over others. Alternatively, because her success is measured by her convic-
tion rate, she may be tempted to ignore the rights of defendants, victims, or
the community in order to obtain pleas or guilty verdicts.
Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecu-
tors Do Justice?, 44 Vand. L. Rev. 45, 58-59 (1991).
118. See Kenneth Culp Davis, Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry 190
(1969) (noting "the prevailing assumption that decisions to prosecute or not to prose-
cute never call for reasoned opinions"); Paul E. Dow, Discretionary Justice: A Criti-
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tarily kept in a particular prosecutor's office, they would not be avail-
able to the general public'1 9 and ordinarily would not be discoverable
by other parties in a legal proceeding. 20 Finally, victims are not legal
parties in criminal proceedings' 21 and do not have standing to chal-
lenge prosecutorial decisions in the criminal setting.12
Criminal defendants and crime victims claiming race-based
prosecutorial policies or practices typically allege a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.'-3 As the
following discussion illustrates, it is extremely difficult to challenge
such policies and practices successfully in light of equal protection law.
The available legal avenues include a federal civil rights claim under
42 U.S.C. § 1983124 and a motion to dismiss the indictment for selec-
tive prosecution based on race filed by a criminal defendant during
the pendency of his case."z
cal Inquiry 125 (1981) ("There are no records kept concerning the prosecutor's
motives for instituting litigation.").
119. See Vorenberg, supra note 24, at 1565 (noting that these records, if they exist
at all, are confidential).
120. Prosecutors may be required to justify certain discretionary decisions in re-
sponse to a legal challenge by a criminal defendant such as a motion to dismiss an
indictment for selective prosecution. See infra Part III.B. But see infra Part III.C (dis-
cussing the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456
(1996), requiring criminal defendants claiming selective prosecution to make a very
detailed showing of discriminatory impact before receiving discovery of internal
prosecutorial records).
121. See Wayne R. LaFave & Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 13.3. at 629-30
(2d ed. 1992) (noting the "generally accepted view" that the prosecution function
should be performed by a public prosecutor rather than a private party, and limiting a
private party's role to seeking writ of mandamus by a court to compel a prosecutor to
initiate a prosecution-a request rarely granted by courts).
122. But see S.J. Res. 6, 105th Cong. (1997), which would give victims of violent
crime the right:
(1) to be informed of his alleged attacker's trial; (2) to be present at all
stages of the trial; (3) to be heard at sentencing; (4) to object to plea bargains
or release from custody; (5) to be given notice of any release or escape: and
(6) to receive full restitution from the convicted offender.
Monroe Leigh, Witness Anonymity is Inconsistent with Due Process, 91 Am. J. Int'l L
80, 83 (1997) (summarizing proposed Victims' Rights Amendment). For articles in
support of a Victims' Rights Amendment, see Richard Barajas & Scott Alexander
Nelson, The Proposed Crime Victims' Federal Constitutional Amendment: Working
Toward a Proper Balance, 49 Baylor L. Rev. 1 (1997); Richard M. Romley, Letter to
the Editor, Constitutional Rights for Victims: Another Perspective, Prosecutor, Jan.-
Feb. 1997, at 7. For arguments against a Victims' Rights Amendment, see William W.
Taylor, III., Victims' Rights & the Constitution: Proceed with Caution, Prosecutor,
Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 12; see also Robert Fichenberg, The Controversial Victims' Rights
Amendmen4 Prosecutor, Sept.-Oct. 1996, at 38.
123. "No state shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
124. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
125. See Developments in tle Law, supra note 91, at 153749 (discussing the selec-
tive prosecution doctrine).
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A. Federal Civil Rights Claims
Both victims of crimes and criminal defendants may bring federal
civil rights claims against prosecutors alleging racially selective prose-
cution in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 12 6 A victim claim-
ing discrimination would attempt to compel a prosecutor to bring
charges against a particular person or persons on the ground that the
prosecutor has given preferential treatment to such persons because
of their race.'27 A criminal defendant may also bring a civil rights
action, claiming that the prosecutor is seeking to prosecute him be-
cause of his race.
128
Courts have been unreceptive to these claims, making it difficult
even to establish standing. 29 In fact, by raising the bar on standing
requirements, the courts have avoided reaching the substantive issues.
To establish standing, a plaintiff must show that she has suffered a
direct injury-in-fact, 130 that the injury is traceable to the alleged un-
lawful conduct of the prosecutor, 131 and that the injury is redressable
by the relief requested. 32 This standing requirement has been partic-
ularly onerous for African Americans seeking class action relief on
the ground that prosecutorial practices have discriminated against Af-
rican Americans as a group.' 33 Even if the plaintiff is able to establish
standing, she must prove discriminatory motive on the part of the
prosecutor.13
4
126. Such claims may be brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-83, 1985 and under the
U.S. Constitution. Criminal defendants would bring these claims as separate civil
actions.
127. See NAACP v. Levi, 418 F. Supp. 1109, 1115-17 (D.D.C. 1976) (finding denial
of plaintiff's civil rights in failure of federal officers to adequately investigate shooting
of plaintiff's husband by state police officers); Developments in the Law, supra note
91, at 1532-35 (discussing federal civil rights suits).
128. See Developments in the Law, supra note 91, at 1532-35 (describing the process
of plaintiffs bringing "federal civil rights suits against prosecutors for allegedly engag-
ing in racially selective prosecution"). Criminal defendants would raise such claims in
a separate civil action.
129. See id. at 1533 (explaining why "courts have indicated a clear lack of receptiv-
ity to these suits").
130. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).
131. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 261 (1977).
132. See Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rts. Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976).
133. For example, in O'Shea v. Littleton, African American citizens brought a class
action suit against a prosecutor, a magistrate and a judge, alleging discriminatory
treatment in bond-setting, sentencing, and jury fee practices. 414 U.S. 488 (1974). The
Court dismissed the claim, holding that the plaintiffs did not have standing because
they were not current victims of specific discrimination. See id. at 495-96.
134. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-48 (1976). Although the discrimi-
natory intent requirement was developed in criminal cases alleging selective prosecu-
tion, the Court has applied this requirement in the civil context as well. See
Developments in the Law, supra note 91, at 1542 (describing "an impossibly high bur-
den of proof on defendants attempting to raise claims of selective prosecution in the
racial context").
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B. Selective Prosecution in Criminal Cases
The selective prosecution claim is more commonly raised by a crim-
inal defendant seeking dismissal of his case on the ground that he has
been singled out for prosecution in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. 3 ' In Oyler v. Boles,136 the Supreme Court held that selective
prosecution violates the Constitution only if it is based on an unjustifi-
able standard such as race, religion, or some other arbitrary classifica-
tion.'37 The Court also held that the selectivity must be purposeful or
intentional.138 After Oyler, a number of circuit courts accepted evi-
dence of disproportionate impact as adequate proof of intentional
discrimination. 39
The Second Circuit's decision in United States v. Berrios reversed
the trend of accepting evidence of disparate impact as proof of pur-
poseful discrimination."4 Mr. Berrios claimed he was singled out for
prosecution because of his outspoken opposition to President
Nixon.' 4' The court rejected his claim, establishing a more strict two-
pronged analysis. The court held that a defendant claiming selective
prosecution must establish: (1) that others similarly situated have not
been prosecuted; and (2) that the decision to prosecute him was dis-
criminatory and made invidiously or in bad faith. 4 2 Thus, both dis-
criminatory effect as well as purpose was required.'43
The requirement of an independent showing of discriminatory pur-
pose was solidified by the Supreme Court's landmark equal protection
decision in Washington v. Davis.' In Davis, African Americans
claimed that a civil service examination discriminated against them on
the basis of race. The Court held that they must prove discriminatory
purpose independent of disproportionate impact to prove that a
facially neutral law violates the Equal Protection Clause. 45 Lower
135. See Developments in the Law, supra note 91, at 1535-36 (discussing selective
prosecution claim).
136. 368 U.S. 448 (1962).
137. See id& at 456.
138. See id.
139. For detailed discussion of circuit cases which allowed evidence of dispropor-
tionate impact as proof of intentional discrimination, see Developments in the Law,
supra note 91, at 1536-39.
140. 501 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir. 1974).
141. See id. at 1209.
142. See id. at 1211.
143. Several circuit courts applied the Berrios two-pronged analysis, holding that
evidence of disproportionate impact satisfied the discriminatory effect prong but not
the discriminatory purpose prong. See, eg., United States v. Ojala, 544 F.2d 940, 943-
45 (8th Cir. 1976) (rejecting a claim that the appellant was impermissibly selected for
prosecution after he announced his purposeful refusal to comply with IRS filing re-
quirements); United States v. Hazel, 696 F.2d 473, 475 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding that
defendants singled out for "great notoriety of their protests" failed to prove imper-
missible motive for prosecutor).
144. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
145. See id at 237-39.
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courts subsequently applied the strict intent requirement in the selec-
tive prosecution context.146
In 1985, the Supreme Court decided Wayte v. United States,147 di-
rectly applying the strict intent standard to a selective prosecution
case. In Wayte, the defendant claimed that he had been prosecuted
because he had written letters to the President and other government
officials informing them of his refusal to register for the draft. 148 The
Court rejected his claim, holding that, even if there was evidence of
discriminatory impact, Mr. Wayte must prove that the government in-
tended to discriminate against him because of his protests. 49 The
Court made it clear that a showing of discriminatory impact was not
sufficient to infer a discriminatory motive. Thus, since Wayte, defend-
ants must make a prima facie showing of discriminatory purpose and
effect even to obtain an evidentiary hearing, and statistical evidence of
disproportionate impact is insufficient to show discriminatorypurpose.15°
C. United States v. Armstrong
In United States v. Armstrong,15 the Supreme Court established the
applicable standard for discovery in selective prosecution claims based
on race.152 The case is also significant because the Court affirmed its
unwillingness to interfere with the exercise of prosecutorial discretion
and sanctioned the difficult standard for a plaintiff or criminal defend-
ant who alleges selective prosecution.153 Furthermore, the Court cre-
ated near-impossible constitutional limitations in the discovery stage
of selective prosecution claims.' 54 Armstrong affirms the Court's fail-
ure to provide meaningful judicial relief for race-based selective pros-
ecution and establishes the need for creative non-judicial remedies.
146. See, e.g., Delaware v. Holloway, 460 A.2d 976, 978-80 (Del. Super. Ct. 1983)
(holding that the defendant must prove intentional and purposeful discrimination in
tax violation charges); State v. Russell, 343 N.W.2d 36, 37 (Minn. 1984) (holding that
the defendants charged with theft who claimed that they were victims of racially dis-
criminatory enforcement failed to meet their burden of establishing a prima facie case
of racially discriminatory impact and discriminatory intent); State v. Bird Head, 285
N.W.2d 698, 702 (Neb. 1979) (noting that Native American defendants must allege
and prove deliberate selective process of enforcement based on race); State v. Shecdy
480 A.2d 887, 888 (N.H. 1984) (rejecting a claim of selective prosecution where a
defendant convicted of "wilfully intercepting" telephone conversations had not estab-
lished intentional or purposeful discrimination).
147. 470 U.S. 598 (1985).
148. See id. at 601, 604.
149. See id. at 608-10.
150. See Developments in the Law, supra note 91, at 1541-42 (discussing the impact
of Wayte).
151. 517 U.S. 456 (1996).
152. See id. at 467-68.
153. See id. at 464-65.
154. See id. at 465.
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In Armstrong, nine black defendants in Los Angeles were charged
in federal court with conspiring to distribute and conspiring to possess
with intent to distribute more than fifty grams of cocaine base (crack).
They were also charged with various firearms offenses. The defend-
ants filed a motion to dismiss the indictment for selective prosecution
based on race. They claimed that the United States Attorney prose-
cuted virtually all African Americans charged with crack offenses in
federal court, leaving all white crack defendants to be prosecuted in
state court. Their claim was based on the fact that the federal law
penalizes crack trafficking much more harshly than the California
state law.155
The defendants filed a discovery motion to obtain information in
support of their claim. The information requested included the
United States Attorney's criteria for deciding whether to bring
charges in federal court and the number and racial identity of all de-
fendants charged with crack offenses in both federal court and state
court. The district court granted the motion.156 The Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court after a rehearing en
banc, holding that a "colorable basis" for selective prosecution entitles
a defendant to discovery and that a defendant is not required to
demonstrate that the government has failed to prosecute other simi-
larly situated defendants.' 57
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit decision, holding
that, in order to establish entitlement to discovery in selective prose-
cution cases based on race, a defendant must produce credible evi-
dence that similarly situated defendants of other races could have
been prosecuted, but were not.'58 The Court held that the defendants
in Armstrong did not meet this threshold. Before establishing the
standard for discovery in selective prosecution cases based on race,
the Armstrong Court reviewed and reaffirmed the requirements for
prevailing on the merits in such cases. Citing Oyler v. Boles15 9 and
Wayte v. United States, 60 the Court reiterated the equal protection
standard applicable in selective prosecution claims. The Court noted
that the claimant must show discriminatory effect and purpose, and
explained that, to establish discriminatory effect, the claimant must
show that "similarly situated individuals of a different race were not
prosecuted.' 61
155. Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 11351-11351.5 (Vest 1991) (establishing a two-
to-five year sentence for distribution of cocaine); see United States v. Armstrong, 48
F.3d 1508, 1510-12 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc), revd, 517 U.S. 456 (1996).
156. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 462.
157. See Armstrong, 48 F.3d at 1513-14.
158. See Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 466-67.
159. 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962).
160. 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985).
161. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 466-67.
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Obviously anticipating the difficulty in meeting this standard, the
Court proclaimed that the "similarly situated" requirement does not
make it impossible to prevail in these cases.' 62 In support of this state-
ment, the Court cited the only case in which it upheld a claim of race-
based selective prosecution-Yick Wo v. Hopkins.163 The plaintiff in
Yick Wo was able to prove that similarly situated laundry operators of
another race could have been prosecuted, but were not.164 The
Court's citation of Yick Wo is significant primarily because the case
was decided 112 years ago. The Court obviously failed to recognize
that 1886 race remedies are not applicable to 1998 race problems. The
nature of racism and discrimination has changed significantly since
1886.165 Racism and discrimination are not always overtly displayed
or even intentional. 66 Although Justice Brennan's dissent in McCles-
key v. Kemp 167 and Justice Marshall's concurrence in Batson v. Ken-
162. Id.
163. See id. (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)).
164. See Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 467.
165. The thinly veiled racial animus of the respondents in Yick Wo is less prevalent
in case law a century later. Racial prejudice today is more likely to be unconscious.
Charles Lawrence approaches unconscious racism from a Freudian perspective. He
notes that "the human mind defends itself against the discomfort of guilt by denying
or refusing to recognize those ideas, wishes, and beliefs that conflict with what the
individual has learned is good [and] right." Lawrence, supra note 102, at 322. Law-
rence then concludes: "While our historical experience has made racism an integral
part of our culture, our society has more recently embraced an ideal that rejects ra-
cism as immoral. When an individual experiences conflict between racist ideas and
the societal ethic that condemns those ideas, the mind excludes his racism from con-
sciousness." Id. at 322-23 (footnote omitted).
Adding lessons from cognitive psychology's study of unstated cultural beliefs, Law-
rence writes:
The individual is unaware.., that the ubiquitous presence of a cultural ster-
eotype has influenced her perception that blacks are lazy or unintelligent.
Because racism is so deeply ingrained in our culture, it is likely to be trans-
mitted by tacit understandings: Even if a child is not told that blacks are
inferior, he learns that lesson by observing the behavior of others. These
tacit understandings, because they have never been articulated, are less
likely to be experienced at a conscious level.
Id. at 323. Applying his theory of unconscious racism to Equal Protection jurispru-
dence, Lawrence continues:
[R]equiring proof of conscious or intentional motivation as a prerequisite to
constitutional recognition that a decision is race-dependent ignores much of
what we understand about how the human mind works. It also disregards
both the irrationality of racism and the profound effect that the history of
American race relations has had on the individual and collective
unconscious.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
166. See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing unconscious racism).
167. Justice Brennan argued that:
The discretion afforded prosecutors and jurors in the Georgia capital sen-
tencing system creates such opportunities. No guidelines govern
prosecutorial decisions to seek the death penalty, and Georgia provides ju-
ries with no list of aggravating and mitigating factors, nor any standard for
balancing them against one another. Once a jury identifies one aggravating
factor, it has complete discretion in choosing life or death, and need not
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tucky' 6 acknowledged and explained unconscious racism1 69 and its
effect on prosecutors, the Armstrong opinion chose to ignore the
subject.
The Court's citation of Yick Wo is also problematic because it was
decided long before Wayte v. United States. Wayte imposed the strict
intent requirement in selective prosecution cases-a requirement that
the plaintiff in Yick Wo did not have to fulfill. Furthermore, the fact
that no civil plaintiff or criminal defendant in a race-based selective
prosecution case has prevailed in the Supreme Court in 112 years sug-
gests the scant likelihood of satisfying the "similarly situated"
requirement. 170
After reviewing the requirements for proving a selective prosecu-
tion claim based on race, the Court established the showing necessary
to obtain discovery in support of such claims. To obtain discovery, a
defendant must "show that the Government declined to prosecute
similarly situated suspects of other races.' 71 This showing is amaz-
ingly similar to the proof necessary to establish the "discriminatory
effect" prong of the ultimate claim." To prevail on the merits, in
addition to establishing discriminatory intent, a defendant must prove
that "similarly situated individuals of a different race were not prose-
cuted."' 73 Other language in the opinion differentiates the standards
only slightly. The Court stated that to obtain discovery, a defendant
must produce "some evidence that similarly situated [individuals]
could have been prosecuted but were not.' 74 It also stated that the
defendant must make a "credible showing of different treatment of
similarly situated persons."'175
The Court failed to explain precisely the difference between prov-
ing a failure to prosecute similarly situated individuals of another race
and producing "some evidence" or a "credible showing" of the same.
articulate its basis for selecting life imprisonment. The Georgia sentencing
system therefore provides considerable opportunity for racial considera-
tions, however subtle and unconscious, to influence charging and sentencing
decisions.
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 333-34 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote
omitted).
168. Justice Marshall argued that:
A prosecutor's own conscious or unconscious racism may lead him easily to
the conclusion that a prospective black juror is 'sullen,' or 'distant,' a charac-
terization that would not have come to his mind if a white juror had acted
identically. A judge's own conscious or unconscious racism may lead him to
accept such an explanation as well supported.
476 U.S. 79, 106 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring).
169. See supra Part II.B.1.
170. Review of Supreme Court cases citing Yick Wo.
171. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 458 (1996).
172. Id. at 465.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 469.
175. Id. at 470.
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One would assume that more proof is necessary to prevail on the mer-
its than to obtain discovery, but how much more? And how much is
needed to cross the discovery threshold? One white suspected drug
dealer? Two? The Court was equally vague on what constitutes
"credible" evidence. The sworn affidavit of a member of the bar did
not suffice in Armstrong,176 yet the Court expressed no similar con-
cerns about the sworn affidavits of law enforcement agents.
The Court was particularly critical of the conclusion of the court of
appeals that "people of all races commit all types of crimes.' 1 77 The
Court purported to dispute this conclusion by citing statistics of the
United States Sentencing Commission. Once again, the Court's evi-
dence in support of its conclusions failed to prove its point. As proof
that people of certain races commit certain types of crimes, the Court
cited the Sentencing Commission's statistics which show that "[m]ore
than 90% of the persons sentenced in 1994 for crack cocaine traffick-
ing were black ... ; 93.4% of convicted LSD dealers were white... ;
and 91% of those convicted for pornography or prostitution were
white ... "'78 Thus the Court inappropriately cited conviction and
sentencing statistics as proof of who commits these crimes.
The very reason for bringing a selective prosecution claim is to
show that there are people committing the crimes who are not being
prosecuted, convicted, and sentenced. As Justice Stevens pointed out
in his dissent:
The presumption that some whites are prosecuted in state court is
not "contradicted" by the statistics the majority cites, which show
only that high percentages of blacks are convicted of certain federal
crimes, while high percentages of whites are convicted of other fed-
eral crimes .... Those figures are entirely consistent with the allega-
tion of selective prosecution. The relevant comparison, rather,
would be with the percentages of blacks and whites who commit
those crimes.' 79
This flaw in the Court's reasoning is troubling on several levels. First,
it could illustrate a basic failure to recognize that conviction and sen-
tencing statistics do not accurately reflect crime rates. Second, it
could reflect the Court's unwillingness to question the prosecutorial
decisions of the Executive branch. Language in the Court's opinion
suggests that, at a minimum, the latter view is true. Throughout the
opinion, the Court extolled the importance of the prosecutor's broad
discretion to enforce the laws 8 ° and the "presumption of regularity"
176. The Court deemed the affidavit to be "hearsay" and "personal conclusions
based on anecdotal evidence." Id.
177. Id. at 469 (quoting United States v. Armstrong, 48 F.3d 1508, 1516-17 (9th Cir.
1995)).
178. Id. at 469 (citations omitted).
179. Id. at 482 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
180. See id. at 464.
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supporting prosecutorial decisions."' 1 The Court affirmed judicial def-
erence to prosecutorial decisions, noting the competence of prosecu-
tors in these areas and the concern that a court's examination of the
basis of a prosecutor's decision would threaten to chill law enforce-
ment"8 and "undermine prosecutorial effectiveness by revealing the
Government's enforcement policy." 183
Armstrong leaves the ordinary criminal defendant with little hope
that he might ever prevail on a race-based selective prosecution claim
and even less guidance on how he might do so. Even if the Court had
more precisely explained the quality and quantity of evidence neces-
sary to cross the discovery threshold, it is doubtful that most criminal
defendants would be able to meet that standard. Most criminal de-
fendants are indigent"s4 and thus incapable of hiring lawyers and ex-
perts to conduct the type of investigation and reports apparently
necessary to obtain discovery. Indeed, the evidence presented by the
federal defender in Armstrong was probably more than most
overburdened court appointed attorneys would be able to produce.18
Armstrong also affirms the inadequacy of current legal remedies to
correct the discriminatory effect of prosecutorial decisions. Arm-
strong addresses the standard for discovery and affirms the standard
for prevailing on the merits in race-based selective prosecution cases.
The failure to prosecute similarly situated persons of another race
only establishes discriminatory effect.'" The defendant must also
prove that the prosecutor was motivated by a discriminatory pur-
pose.8 7 The Armstrong Court does not address the amount of proof
necessary for a showing of discriminatory purpose. One could only
imagine that such proof would be impossible short of a frank admis-
sion of prejudice by a prosecutor or discovery of clearly prejudicial
documents. 8 8 Given the nature of modern-day racism and discrimi-
181. Id. (quoting United States v. Chemical Found. Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926)).
182. See id. at 465 (quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985)).
183. Id. (quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985)).
184. See Francis D. Doucette, Non-Appointment of Counsel in Indigent Criminal
Cases: A Case Study, 31 New Eng. L. Rev. 495, 511 (1997) (-It also overlooks the
unavoidable fact that the majority of criminal defendants, misdemeanor and felony
alike, are indigent and likely to remain so."); see also Norman Lefstein, Criminal De-
fense Services for the Poor 3 n.4 (1982) (describing how of seven million felony and
non-traffic misdemeanor arrests in 1971, approximately 3.4 million required ap-
pointed counsel).
185. See Lefstein, supra note 184, at 3; see also Richard Berk & Alec Campbell,
Preliminary Data on Race and Crack Charging Practices in Los Angeles, 6 Fed. Sen-
tencing Rep. 37 (1993) (reporting on a study of state and federal charging practices in
Los Angeles and finding that 222 crack defendants in state prosecutions were white,
compared to 4410 black defendants; there were no white crack defendants in federal
court, and 36 of 43 federal crack defendants were black).
186. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465.
187. Id.
188. For a discussion of the difficulty of proving intentional discrimination by a
prosecutor, see Donald G. Gifford, Equal Protection and the Prosecutor's Charging
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nation, it is highly improbable that such evidence could be
produced.18 9
The Court's decision in McCleskey v. Kemp, 9 ' decided almost ten
years prior to Armstrong, confirms the improbability that the Court
will accept even highly incriminating statistical evidence as sufficient
to prove intentional behavior. Warren McCleskey was an African
American man who used a statistical study to challenge the imposition
of the death penalty in his case after he was convicted of killing a
white police officer in the State of Georgia. 191 The study, conducted
by Professor David Baldus, provided stark statistical evidence of race
discrimination in the implementation of the death penalty in Georgia.
Professor Baldus examined thousands of murder cases in Georgia and
the numerous variables that might influence the imposition of the
death penalty.1 92 Baldus took into consideration hundreds of such
nonracial variables, including age, education, prior criminal record,
and the strength of the evidence, and concluded that in Georgia, de-
fendants who killed whites were 4.3 times more likely to receive the
death penalty than defendants who killed blacks. 193
Mr. McCleskey claimed that his race and the race of his victim had
played an unconstitutionally impermissible role in the decision to sen-
tence him to death. 194 Mr. McCleskey's claim was ultimately rejected
by the Supreme Court in a five to four decision. The Court held that
the Baldus study did not prove that criminal justice officials in Mr.
McCleskey's case, including prosecutors, had intentionally discrimi-
nated on the basis of race and that the Court would require "excep-
tionally clear proof" before inferring that a sentencing authority had
abused its discretion. 195 The Court stated that the Baldus study did
Decision: Enforcing an Ideal, 49 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 659, 692-698 (1981) (discussing
difficulty in using statistical data to establish prima facie case of prosecutorial bias);
Vorenberg, supra note 24, at 1542 (noting near impossibility of proving a prosecutor's
discriminatory motive); Tracey L. McCain, Note, The Interplay of Editorial and
Prosecutorial Discretion in the Perpetuation of Racism in the Criminal Justice System,
25 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 601, 639 (1992) (noting the lack of recordkeeping of
reasons for charging decisions as undercutting task of proving selective prosecution).
But see Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme
Court Rhetoric, 86 Geo. L.J. 279 (1997) (arguing that intentional discrimination only
requires proof of differential treatment, not proof of animus or illicit motive).
189. In McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), the defendant produced statistical
evidence of the discriminatory effect of prosecutorial decisions to seek the death pen-
alty, but such evidence was deemed insufficient to prove purposeful discrimination
against Mr. McCleskey by prosecutors in the state of Georgia. See infra notes 219-27
and accompanying text.
190. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
191. See id.
192. See id. at 287-89; Kennedy, supra note 10, at 328-32 (discussing the Baldus
study).
193. See McClesky, 481 U.S. at 286-89.
194. See id. at 286.
195. See id. at 297.
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not meet this standard,'96 despite that many distinguished researchers
have acknowledged the accuracy and legitimacy of the study's
methodology. 1
97
As in Armstrong, the McCleskey Court extolled the virtues of
prosecutorial discretion. 19 Given the sophistication of the Baldus
study and the Court's deference to prosecutorial discretion, McCles-
key and Armstrong lend little hope to criminal defendants seeking to
present statistical evidence of discriminatory treatment by prosecu-
tors.199 The three separate dissenting opinions in McCleskey thor-
oughly discuss the evidence of racial discrimination in the
implementation of the death penalty. 0 Even Justice Scalia, who
joined the majority opinion in McCleskey, acknowledged the existence
of race discrimination in the criminal process. In a memorandum to
196. See id.
197. See Kennedy, supra note 10, at 330-31 (discussing analysis of the Baldus
study).
198. "[Tlhe policy considerations behind a prosecutor's traditionally 'wide discre-
tion' suggest the impropriety of our requiring prosecutors to defend their decisions to
seek death penalties, 'often years after they were made."' McClesky, 481 U.S. at 296.
199. But see Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). In Batson, the Supreme Court
banned racially discriminatory peremptory challenges and established a process that
requires the prosecutor to give a race neutral explanation for peremptory challenges
after the defendant has made out a prima facie case that the prosecutor is using his
strikes in a racially discriminatory manner. In his concurring opinion, Justice Mar-
shall discussed the role of unconscious racism in prosecutorial decisions and suggested
that prosecutors will always be able to come up with some race neutral reason to
mask either unconscious or intentional discrimination. Cases decided since Batson
seem to confirm Justice Marshall's prediction. See, e.g., United States v. Forbes, 819
F.2d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1987) (finding a challenge to have been racially neutral when
prosecutor "sensed by [the juror's] posture and demeanor that she was hostile to be-
ing in court"); Wallace v. State, 530 So. 2d 849 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987) (dismissing a
peremptory challenge by prosecutor who removed a young black woman juror be-
cause she was a homemaker and lacked knowledge of what life was like out on the
street, a middle-aged black woman because she appeared to be same age as defend-
ants' parents, a young black man because he had a beard, and a middle-aged black
man because he was unemployed); Charles J. Ogletree, Just Say No!: A Proposal to
Eliminate Racially Discriminatory Uses of Peremptory Challenges, 31 Am. Crim. L
Rev. 1099, 1107-12 (1994) (describing courts that frequently accept race-neutral ex-
planations that appear to be made on subconsciously racial grounds).
200. Justice Brennan stated that "[c]lose analysis of the Baldus study, however, in
light of both statistical principles and human experience, reveals that the risk that race
influenced McCleskey's sentence is intolerable by any imaginable standard." McCles-
key, 481 U.S. at 325 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Blackmun noted
that "[t]he most persuasive evidence ... is McCleskey's proof that the race of the
victim is more important in explaining the imposition of a death sentence than is the
factor whether the defendant was a prime mover in the homicide." Id. at 355 (Black-
mun, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens added that "[t]he studies demonstrate a strong
probability that McCleskey's sentencing jury... was influenced by the fact that Mc-
Cleskey is black and his victim was white, and that this same outrage would not have
been generated if he had killed a member of his own race." Id. at 366 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted); see also Kennedy, supra note 10, at 333-35 (discussing
the dissenting opinions).
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the other justices before the opinion was published, Justice Scalia
wrote:
And I do not share the view, implicit in the opinion, that an effect of
racial factors upon sentencing, if it could only be shown by suffi-
ciently strong statistical evidence, would require reversal. Since it is
my view that the unconscious operation of irrational sympathies and
antipathies, including racial, upon jury decisions and (hence)
prosecutorial decisions is real, acknowledged in the decisions of this
court, and ineradicable, I cannot honestly say that all I need is more
proof.201
These cases and Justice Scalia's acknowledgement of the effect of un-
conscious racism on prosecutorial decisions suggest that prosecutors
must be held accountable for the exercise of their discretion through
nonjudicial means.
IV. PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION-POWER, PRIVILEGE, AND
ETHICAL RESPONSIBILITY
Given the inadequacy of current legal remedies to combat race dis-
crimination in the criminal justice system, the Court's recent affirma-
tion of broad prosecutorial discretion, and the high legal barriers
erected to discourage selective prosecution claims, other remedies
must be constructed and implemented. Officials in all three branches
of government certainly have the responsibility to seek remedies for
disparities and discrimination in the criminal justice system. Likewise,
criminal justice officials (law enforcement officers, defense attorneys,
prosecutors, judges, probation and parole officers, and corrections of-
ficials) should all have an interest in, and the responsibility for, elimi-
nating discrimination within the system. Prosecutors, however, are
uniquely positioned and empowered to remedy these injustices most
effectively and efficiently.
As members of the Executive branch and highly specialized officials
in the criminal justice system, prosecutors are in the unique position
to use their discretion to eliminate many of the racial disparities in the
criminal justice system.2 °2 No other official is empowered to effect
such change. The Court's recent reaffirmation of prosecutorial power
in Armstrong should encourage prosecutors to use it not only as a
shield against claims of wrongdoing, but as a weapon against any
201. Justice Scalia's Memorandum to the Conference, McClesky (No. 84-6811)
(found among Justice Marshall's papers after his death).
202. The Model Code of Professional Responsibility states that:
The responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advo-
cate; his duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict. This special duty exists
because: (1) the prosecutor represents the sovereign and therefore should
use restraint in the discretionary exercise of governmental powers, such as in
the selection of cases to prosecute.
Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-13 (1981).
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wrongdoing in the criminal justice system, including race
discrimination." 3
The elimination of race discrimination is totally consistent with the
role of the prosecutor. It is the responsibility of the prosecutor to
seek justice, not simply to win convictions.2' As the Supreme Court
noted in Brady v. Maryland:
Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when crimi-
nal trials are fair, our system of the administration of justice suffers
when any accused is treated unfairly. An inscription on the walls of
the Department of Justice states the proposition candidly for the
federal domain: "The United States wins its point whenever justice
is done its citizens in the courts."' 5
The duty to seek justice is not limited to the prosecutor's responsibili-
ties in individual cases, but also applies to the administration of justice
in the criminal justice system as a whole. In fact, the prosecutor's du-
ties include the oversight function of insuring the fairness and effi-
ciency of the criminal justice system. 2° 6 Those duties should include
recognizing injustice in the system and initiating corrective
measures.
20 7
The prosecutor's duties and responsibilities to the criminal justice
system as a whole stem from her dual role as an advocate for the gov-
203. See generally Meares, supra note 31 (proposing the use of financial incentives
to encourage a higher standard of ethical behavior by prosecutors than required by
the Constitution).
204. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935); Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility EC 7-13 ("The responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from
that of the usual advocate; his duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict."); Model
Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.8 cmt. (1983) (describing a prosecutor's respon-
sibilities "to see that [a] defendant is accorded procedural justice and that guilt is
decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence"); Standards Relating to the Admin. of
Criminal Justice Standard 3-1.2(c) (1992) ("The duty of the prosecutor is to seek jus-
tice, not merely to convict."). For a critique of the Model Code's "do justice" stan-
dard, see Zacharias, supra note 117, at 48 (explaining that the 'do justice' standard
establishes no identifiable norm and its vagueness leaves prosecutors with only their
individual sense of morality to determine just conduct).
205. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (citing Judge Simon E. Sobeloff, Address at the Judicial
Conference of the Fourth Circuit (June 29, 1954)).
206. Zacharias, supra note 117, at 57 (citing Carol A. Corrigan, On Prosecutorial
Ethics, 13 Hastings Coast. L.Q. 537, 538-39 (1986)).
207. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 8-1; see also id. EC 8-9
("The advancement of our legal system is of vital importance in maintaining the rule
of law and in facilitating orderly changes; therefore, lavyers should encourage, and
should aid in making, needed changes and improvements."); Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct pmbl. ("A lawyer should be mindful of deficiencies in the administra-
tion of justice .... ."); Standards Relating to the Admin. of Criminal Justice Standard
3-1.2(d) ("It is an important function of the prosecutor to seek to reform and improve
the administration of criminal justice. When inadequacies or injustices in the substan-
tive or procedural law come to the prosecutor's attention, he or she should stimulate
efforts for remedial action.").
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ernment and as an administrator of justice.208 As administrator of jus-
tice, the prosecutor represents the interests of society as a whole,
including the interests of the defendant as a member of society.2 9
The prosecutor often experiences tension and conflict in her attempt
to implement these dual roles.210
The prosecutor's duty to combat discrimination in the criminal jus-
tice system exemplifies the conflict in the implementation of these
dual responsibilities. On the one hand, the prosecutor has a duty as
both an advocate for the government and a representative of society
to protect the community through the enforcement of the criminal
laws. On the other hand, she has a responsibility to ensure that vic-
tims and defendants in the criminal justice system are treated fairly,
equitably, and in a nondiscriminatory manner. The latter responsibil-
ity is owed to individual victims and defendants and to society as a
whole; society has an interest in a fair and nondiscriminatory criminal
justice system. The two responsibilities do not present an insurmount-
able conflict. The simple answer is that the prosecutor must protect
the community through the fair, equitable, and nondiscriminatory en-
forcement of the laws.
The difficulties arise not in the conceptualization of these responsi-
bilities but in their implementation. The facts of United States v. Arm-
strong illustrate these difficulties. If the defendants in Armstrong are
guilty of cocaine trafficking and firearms possession, the government
208. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.8 (outlining special responsi-
bilities of a prosecutor); Standards Relating to the Admin. of Criminal Justice Stan-
dard 3-1.1 (describing the function of the standards as a guide to professional conduct
and performance); see also Melilli, supra note 27, at 697 (describing prosecutor's dual
role as an advocate and as a minister of justice); Vorenberg, supra note 24, at 1524
(discussing how prosecutors shift from an adversarial role to deciding guilt and pun-
ishment). A California court described the prosecutor's role:
[I]t is true that a public prosecutor, as representative of the People, must
satisfy additional standards of conduct by reason of his position as the officer
who possesses the power and authority to speak for the State. In practical
effect the public prosecutor functions in a dual capacity - as both agent and
principal, as both attorney and client. Because he exercises a dual function,
the prosecutor possesses additional responsibilities and becomes subject to
broader duties than does defense counsel, who only exercises the one func-
tion of agent-attorney.
People v. Kelley, 142 Cal. Rptr. 457, 466 (Ct. App. 1977).
209. David M. Nissman & Ed Hagen, The Prosecution Function 7 (1982).
210. See Stanley Z. Fisher, In Search of the Virtuous Prosecutor: A Conceptual
Framework, 15 Am. J. Crim. L. 197, 217 (1988) (discussing prosecutor's "quasi-judi-
cial" role for fairness and justice, and her "zealous advocate" role to maximize the
number of convictions and severity of sentences imposed); Vorenberg, supra note 24,
at 1557 (noting that a prosecutor's commitment to impartiality is inconsistent with the
adversarial role); see also Mellili, supra note 27, at 698 ("[T]he prosecutor is left with
an ongoing schizophrenia, acting simultaneously as an advocate and a minister of jus-
tice. As a result, the prosecutor is faced with a dilemma. He or she must determine
which role will take priority.").
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and society have an interest in their prosecution and punishment.2"
The government and society, however, also have an interest in
preventing both selective prosecution and harsher treatment of black
cocaine traffickers. If a prosecutor becomes aware of criminal behav-
ior by African Americans, how does she assure that they are not being
singled out and treated more harshly than white offenders? Must she
seek out similarly situated white offenders and prosecute them in pro-
portionate numbers? Should she decline to prosecute black offenders
until a proportionate number of similar white offenders are ar-
rested?212 These alternatives, although perhaps controversial, would
be well within the lawful exercise of the prosecutor's discretion.
Prosecutors currently use their discretion not only in the prosecu-
tion of individual cases, but also in the implementation of general pol-
icies.213 United States Attorneys or State's Attorneys may implement
formal or informal general policies regarding the prosecution of cer-
tain types of cases. For example, a chief prosecutor may have a policy
of prosecuting all cases involving firearms possession, domestic vio-
lence, or some other criminal behavior that may be particularly wide-
spread in his community. Likewise, a prosecutor may institute a
policy of dismissing cases involving small quantities of marijuana or of
seeking a probationary sentence for the defendants in these cases.
Each of these policies may reflect the attitudes, values and priorities
of the prosecutor and/or the community about certain criminal
behavior.
The interest and responsibility of both the prosecutor and the com-
munity in the nondiscriminatory treatment of defendants and victims
in the criminal justice system should also be the basis for the imple-
mentation of general prosecutorial policies. As with most criminal
justice policies, they would reflect a balancing of all of the interests at
stake. The goal of the prosecutor's office should be the implementa-
tion of policies in a manner consistent with the overall administration
of justice.214
211. But see Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the
Criminal Justice System, 105 Yale LJ. 677 (1995) (arguing that the high number of
black men in the criminal justice system is the result of societal racism, and advocating
jury nullification by black jurors when African Americans are on trial for certain non-
violent felonies such as drug possession).
212. See Butler, supra note 11, at 877 (arguing that African Americans should be
arrested and sentenced to prison for drug possession only in proportion to involve-
ment in those crimes and that by the year 2000, every jurisdiction in the United States
should maintain a prison population which reflects racial demographics of that
jurisdiction).
213. See Vorenberg, supra note 24, at 1523-37 (discussing extent of prosecutorial
discretion).
214. The Supreme Court addressed the prosecutor's responsibility to balance the
interests of law enforcement and protecting the rights of the accused in Berger v.
United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935).
He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so.
But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones.
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V. RACIAL IMPACT STUDIES AND THE REMEDIAL USE OF
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
Not every disparity is evidence of discrimination. Since many legiti-
mate factors affect prosecutorial decisions, it may be appropriate to
treat victims and defendants differently, even in similar cases. 15 A
prerequisite to eliminating race discrimination in the criminal process
is the determination of whether the dissimilar treatment of similarly
situated people is based on race rather than some legitimate reason.
Whether the treatment is intentional or purposeful should not mat-
ter-the goal should be elimination of harm. Thus, the first step is the
implementation of racial impact studies designed to reveal racially dis-
criminatory treatment. The second step is the publication of these
studies so victims of discrimination and the general public may act to
eradicate undesired policies and practices.
A. Racial Impact Studies
Racial impact studies would involve the collection of data on the
race of the defendant and victim for each category of offense and the
status of the case at each step of the prosecutorial process. For exam-
ple, in each case involving an arrest for possession of cocaine, the
prosecutor would document the race of the defendant, the defendant's
criminal history, the initial charging decision, each plea offer made,
accepted, or rejected, and the sentence advocated by the prosecutor.
If relevant, the prosecutor should also document whether and how a
decision was made to charge in federal versus state court and whether
a departure from the sentencing guidelines was sought.
The statistics would be collected for each type of offense so that an
appropriate statistical analysis comparing the disposition of the cases
of white and African American defendants and victims could be done.
These studies would not only be helpful in determining whether de-
fendants of color receive harsher treatment for the same criminal be-
havior, but in cases involving victims, they would also demonstrate
whether cases involving white victims were prosecuted more vigor-
ously than cases involving African American victims.216 The data
would also indicate whether similarly situated defendants and victims
of different races are treated the same at each step of the process.21 7
It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to pro-
duce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring
about a just one.
Id. at 88.
215. For a discussion of the legitimate factors considered in prosecutorial decision-
making, see supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
216. See supra Part III.B (discussing selective prosecution).
217. For purposes of the report, "similarly situated" defendants would have com-
mitted the same criminal act and have similar criminal histories. "Similarly situated"
victims would have the same level of interest in prosecution and similar criminal his-
tories. Other characteristics of either the defendant or the victim (wealth, education,
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Are defendants in cases involving white victims initially charged with
the same offense as similarly situated defendants in cases involving
black victims? Do they receive the same plea offers? Are the same
sentences advocated at the sentencing hearing?
The data may help to reveal the extent to which whites are being
arrested and presented for prosecution by law enforcement officers.
If the majority of the cases in any particular category of offense in-
volve African American defendants, the prosecutor should investigate
further to determine whether African Americans comprise a majority
of the population in that jurisdiction. If they do, the data would not
necessarily indicate the selective detention and prosecution of African
Americans. If African Americans do not comprise a majority of the
population, further investigation would certainly be warranted, partic-
ularly if there is a considerable difference between the arrest rates and
the African American population. The further investigation should
attempt to determine whether African Americans commit the crime in
question at greater rates than whites. In the absence of credible evi-
dence that they do, the prosecutor should presume that no one partic-
ular race is inherently more likely to commit certain types of
crimes.218
Significant conclusions could not be reached from the simple collec-
tion of data without the appropriate statistical analysis. The Baldus
study used in McCleskey v. Kemp exemplifies the model statistical
analysis of this type of data.219 Widely acclaimed as one of the most
thorough and statistically sound analyses of sentencing,?-" the Baldus
study examined thousands of murder cases over a seven-year period
and took into account thirty-nine nonracial variables most likely to
influence sentencing patterns in Georgia before reaching the conclu-
sion that the race of the victim had a statistically significant correla-
tion with the imposition of the death penalty."
Similar studies in prosecutors' offices would determine whether ra-
cial disparities exist in the prosecution of all types of cases and
whether the disparities are statistically significant. A Baldus-type
study which takes those factors into account would be essential to the
jury appeal, etc.) should not be relevant to the prosecutor's calculus, as they would
involve discriminatory treatment based on subjective, inappropriate criteria.
218. The prosecutor should not use conviction and sentencing rates as evidence of
criminality, as the Supreme Court did in Armstrong. As Justice Stevens noted in his
dissent in Armstrong, conviction and sentencing rates only reflect the number of indi-
viduals prosecuted and sentenced for certain crimes, not necessarily the number of
individuals who committed these crimes. See supra notes 177-79 and accompanying
text.
219. See supra notes 192-99 and accompanying text.
220. See Kennedy, supra note 10, at 330-31 (showing how the Baldus study has
received high praise from many distinguished researchers).
221. Id at 329.
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credibility of the evaluation 222 because there are so many legitimate,
nonracial factors that may be considered in prosecutorial decisions.223
This type of evaluation would determine whether race is the determi-
native factor.
B. Publication of the Racial Impact Studies
The racial impact studies will indicate whether, and to what extent,
disparate treatment of similarly situated victims and defendants is
based on race. How, then, might these studies be used to help eradi-
cate race-based disparities? How these studies are used depends, to a
large degree, on whether they are made public. If the results of the
studies are revealed only to the prosecutor, she would have no legal
obligation to take any action. The difficult discovery standard estab-
lished in Armstrong would rarely require a prosecutor to turn over a
racial impact study in a selective prosecution case.224 Similarly, diffi-
cult standing requirements in civil selective prosecution cases225 make
it unlikely that such cases will be brought, much less reach the discov-
ery stage.
If the studies are revealed only to the prosecutor, she would be free
either to do nothing or to take some action to eliminate the dispari-
ties. The Rules of Professional Responsibility suggest that the prose-
cutor would have an ethical obligation to take steps to remedy the
disparities. 26 Prosecutors willing to voluntarily fulfill this obligation
would face the difficult task of establishing and implementing some
workable remedy. Prosecutors who do not view the elimination of
racial disparities as a priority would do nothing.227
Publication of the studies to the general public would be an impor-
tant first step that might serve as a catalyst for developing workable
remedies. The public could hold the prosecutor accountable through
the electoral process by requiring that the disparities either be ex-
plained or remedied. In addition, litigants in selective prosecution ac-
tions could attempt to force similar action.
222. See Developments in the Law, supra note 91, at 1529 n.31 (explaining multiple
regression analysis); see also Franklin M. Fisher, Multiple Regression in Legal Pro-
ceedings, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 702 (1980) (discussing the concepts and proper use of
multiple regression analysis in legal proceedings).
223. See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
224. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 137-52 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 202-08 and accompanying text.
227. But see Poulin, supra note 25, at 1122-24 (suggesting that prosecutors should
respond to claims of selective prosecution by conducting internal investigations and
engaging in other forms of self-regulation).
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1. The Electoral Process
Forty-three states hold popular elections for Attorney General.? s
At the county and municipal level, more than ninety-five percent of
the chief prosecutors are elected. " 9 These positions are highly polit-
ical, and candidates usually campaign on general crime themes, not on
specific proposals about how they plan to exercise their prosecutorial
power.230 Prosecutors are usually elected in the same general elec-
tions as other public officials. The state and county prosecutors hire
assistant district attorneys to handle the caseloads of their offices.
Federal prosecutors are appointed, but their selection is also polit-
ical. The President of the United States appoints the Attorney Gen-
eral who oversees the entire Justice Department. -31 The President
also appoints a United States Attorney for each of the federal judicial
districts.232 The Attorney General may appoint additional Assistant
United States Attorneys for any of the districts.233 The Attorney
General and each United States Attorney must be confirmed by the
United States Senate.3' Thus, the selection and confirmation of the
Attorney General and the United States Attorneys are greatly influ-
enced by the political party of the President and a majority of the
Senate. Theoretically, the confirmation hearings provide an opportu-
nity to inform the public of the practices and policies of a particular
prosecutor since the hearings are open to members of the public, who
may express their views by writing or calling their senators.
Ironically, the current system of choosing state and local prosecu-
tors through the electoral process was established for the purpose of
holding prosecutors accountable to the people they serve. The elected
228. In Alaska, Hawaii, New Hampshire, New Jersey and Wyoming, the governor
appoints the Attorney General. The legislature selects the Attorney General in
Maine, and the state supreme court selects the Attorney General in Tennessee. See
Bill Isaeff, Qualifications, Selection, and Term, in State Attorneys General: Powers
and Responsibilities 15, 15 (Lynne M. Ross ed., 1990).
229. See Misner, supra note 14, at 734.
230. Recent examples of district attorney and attorney general races featuring
"tough on crime" campaign themes with little detail on office policies include Suffolk
County, N.Y., see Rick Brand, Democrats Batik on Anti-Catterson Theme, Newsday
(Suffolk Ed.), June 5, 1997, at A34, Jefferson Parish, La., see Drew Broach, Jeff DA
Candidates Spent Big, Owe Big, limes-Picayune, Jan. 16, 1997, at B1, Buffalo, N.Y.,
see Robert J. McCarthy, In Presidential Year, Two House Races Hold Local Interest,
Buffalo News, Oct. 30, 1996, at IF, Pennsylvania, see Peter J. Shelly, Fisher Exagger-
ates His Experience, Kohn Claims, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Oct. 26, 1996, at Cl, Al-
buquerque, N.M., see Arley Sanchez, DA Faces Ex-Cop in Election, Albuquerque J.,
Sept. 26, 1996, at 1, and Baton Rouge, La., see Angela Simoneaux, DA Candidates for
Crime Prevention, Baton Rouge Advocate, Aug. 30, 1996, at lB. See also Misner,
supra note 14, at 717 (noting difficulty for electorate in scrutinizing prosecutors'
decisions).
231. 28 U.S.C. § 503 (1994).
232. Id. § 541(a).
233. Id. § 542(a).
234. Id. §§ 503, 541(a).
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prosecutor emerged during the rise of Jeffersonian democracy in the
1820s, when the system of popularly elected officials was adopted. 5
No longer beholden to the governor or the court,236 the prosecutor
was deemed accountable to this amorphous body called "the people,"
specifically his constituents. Of course, the actions and decisions of
the prosecutor were not generally a matter of public record, so the
people's ability to hold the prosecutor accountable was quite limited.
Nonetheless, the ballot box was seen as the most democratic and ef-
fective mechanism for achieving this goal.3 7
The public's access to information about prosecutorial decisions has
not expanded since the 1820s. The electorate has very little informa-
tion about a prosecutor's specific charging and plea bargaining prac-
tices or how he plans to exercise his discretion before electing him to
office, or, in the case of appointed prosecutors, before commenting on
his appointment.238 Elected prosecutors typically run on very general
235. See Joan E. Jacoby, The American Prosecutor: A Search of Identity 22 (1980);
Abraham S. Goldstein, Prosecution: History of the Public Prosecutor, in 3 Encyclope-
dia of Crime and Justice 1287 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983).
236. In 1643, Virginia became the first colony to appoint a public prosecutor-the
Attorney General. The Virginia system was modeled after the early English model as
other colonies modeled their public prosecution systems after the native European
countries of their early settlers. Early public prosecutors were appointed by either
the court or the governor. They had little independence and discretion and were re-
quired to consult with the court or governor before making decisions. See Jacoby,
supra note 235, at 11-21; see also Juan Cardenas, The Crime Victim in the Prosecutorial
Process, 9 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 357, 366-71 (1986) (surveying history of public
prosecutor); Goldstein, supra note 235, at 1287 (describing development of public
prosecutor).
237. See Jacoby, supra note 235, at 22; Goldstein, supra note 235, at 1287. In the
1920s, crime commissions were formed in a number of states to examine the status of
the criminal justice system and its ability to manage the post-World War I rise in
crime. Most of these commissions conducted a close examination of the role of the
prosecutor and were shocked by the extent of his power and discretion. A report by
the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement noted: "In every
way the Prosecutor has more power over the administration of justice than the judges,
with much less public appreciation of his power. We have been jealous of the power
of the trial judge, but careless of the continual growth of the power of the prosecuting
attorney." Jacoby, supra note 235, at 28. Commissions formed in Georgia, New York,
Illinois, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and California made similar observations about the
power of the prosecutor. See id. at 30.
The most well-known of the crime commissions of this era was the Wickersham
Commission, a national commission formed to study the status of the criminal justice
system. See id. at 31. The commission included a number of prominent legal scholars
of the day, including Roscoe Pound of the Harvard Law School. Like virtually all of
the state crime commissions, the Wickersham Commission was highly critical of the
role of the prosecutor, particularly the absence of a meaningful check on
prosecutorial power and discretion. See id. It noted that the popular election of pros-
ecutors provided neither an adequate check on this power nor the best qualified can-
didates for the position. See id. The Commission also greatly criticized the plea
bargaining power of prosecutors. See id. It recommended a number of reforms, in-
cluding the establishment of a state director of public prosecutions with secure tenure
to control the prosecutorial process in a systemized fashion. See id.
238. For example, one commentator noted:
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"tough on crime" themes with no information about specific office
policies.239 Certainly issues concerning race, such as strategies for
preventing selective prosecution or other types of discriminatory
treatment, are rarely discussed. 240 Because of the paucity of such rele-
vant information, the Jeffersonian democratic ideals that inspired the
first elected prosecutors in the 1820s have never been achieved 41
Although the electorate can and does vote prosecutors out of office, it
is not making these decisions in a fully informed manner.
The publication of racial impact studies would inform the public
about the possible discriminatory effects of prosecution policies and
practices. Such studies would force a public debate about racial dis-
parities and compel prosecutors to be truly accountable to their con-
stituents. Prosecutors could do this by either establishing policies and
practices to help eliminate the disparities or by explaining that there
are legitimate, race-neutral reasons for such disparities. 42 If the pub-
The reality is that nearly all... decisions to prosecute or not to prosecute ...
and nearly all his reasons for decisions are carefully kept secret, so that re-
view by the electorate is nonexistent except for the occasional case that hap-
pens to be publicized. The plain fact is that more than nine-tenths of local
prosecutors' decisions are supervised or reviewed by no one.
See Kenneth Culp Davis, supra note 118, at 207-08; see also Donald G. Gifford, Mean-
ingful Reform of Plea Bargaining: The Control of Prosecutorial Discretion, 1983 U.
Ill. L. Rev. 37, 54 (discussing the public's lack of access to information about plea
bargaining); Daniel C. Richman, Old Chief v. United States: Stipulating Away
Prosecutorial Accountability?, 83 Va. L. Rev. 939, 963 (1997) (-[E]ven direct elections
are not likely to prove an effective means of giving prosecutors guidance as to a com-
munity's enforcement priorities or of holding them accountable for the discretionary
decisions that they have already made.").
239. In fact, Daniel Richman writes:
Many elections for chief prosecutor are not even contested. Those that are
may be fought on whether a specific type of crime should be prosecuted,
whether a murderer deserves execution, or on the loss of a high-profile case,
as well as on an office's overall win-loss record. Individual referenda on the
broad range of discretionary choices that every prosecutor makes are un-
likely, indeed utterly impossible.
Richman, supra note 238, at 963-64 (citations omitted); see also Misner, supra note 14,
at 772-73 (noting that barely twelve percent of prosecutors' offices have written guide-
lines, leaving the public with little basis for judging prosecutors' effectiveness).
240. Some prosecutors have campaigned on domestic violence issues, but few have
openly discussed race issues. For examples of district attorneys campaigning against
domestic violence, see Robert Greene, Garcetti, Lynch Debate District Attorney's Job
in Opening Shot of Campaign, Metropolitan News-Enterprise, July 11, 1996, at 3;
Brian Maffly, Abuse: The Cycle Is Vicious; Convictions Are Few in Domestic Cases,
Salt Lake Trib., Sept. 30, 1996, at Dl. One district attorney who openly talks about
race, in addition to domestic violence, is San Francisco's Terence Hallinan. See infra
note 250; see also DA Pledges Protection in Satie-Sex Violence, S.F. Chron., May 23,
1997, at A24 (discussing Hallinan's commitment to legal protection for victims of do-
mestic violence in same-sex communities).
241. See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
242. The publication of the studies might compel prosecutors to explain or justify
their decisions, as the Supreme Court required in Batson v. Kentucky. 476 US. 79, 97
(1986). In Batson, the Court held that prosecutors could not use their peremptory
strikes to eliminate African American jurors from a petit jury without providing a
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lic was not satisfied with the results of the study, the efforts to elimi-
nate the disparities, or the prosecutor's explanation for disparities, it
could then remove the prosecutor from office through the electoral
process.243 The public debate would also help the prosecutor to estab-
lish workable remedial policies and practices. Thus, public access to
the studies would motivate prosecutors to correct inequities and help
to make the electoral process a more meaningful check on unaccept-
able prosecutorial practices.
2. Selective Prosecution Claims
Publication of racial impact studies would also allow for their use in
selective prosecution claims brought by either defendants or crime
victims. To the extent that such studies reveal that a prosecutor used
his dismissal power in cases involving white defendants rather than
black defendants, a black defendant claiming selective prosecution
would be able to prove that similarly situated white defendants could
have been prosecuted, but were not.2 " Conversely, if a prosecutor
dismisses cases involving black victims more than those with white vic-
tims, black victims claiming selective prosecution in civil cases would
be able to prove that the cases of similarly situated white victims were
prosecuted when cases of black victims were not prosecuted. In other
words, the racial impact studies would obviate the need for discovery,
thereby making it unnecessary to meet the impossible standard for
discovery established in the Armstrong case.
The racial impact studies would not provide sufficient evidence to
meet the standard of proof for prevailing on the merits in selective
prosecution cases. Presumably, the studies would be sufficient to
prove disparate impact if they reveal disparate dismissal rates based
on race. They undoubtedly would be insufficient to prove the neces-
sary discriminatory intent, however, in light of the Court's rejection of
the Baldus study in McCleskey. 45
race-neutral reason for doing so. Id. at 89. Of course, such an exercise in the context
of racial impact studies would be subject to the same criticisms as Batson. See supra
note 168 and accompanying text.
243. The use of racial stereotypes by prosecutors received rare public attention in
April 1997 during the election campaign for Philadelphia D.A. Lynn Abraham, the
incumbent, released a 10-year-old training video for prosecutors featuring her oppo-
nent, Jack McMahon. In the video, McMahon, who was then a Philadelphia prosecu-
tor, made a presentation on how to pick juries that was laced with crude stereotypes.
McMahon advised rookie prosecutors to avoid picking African Americans from low-
income areas, as well as "young black women, teachers, doctors, social workers and
smart people." He added that the aim of jury selection was not to ensure a fair trial
but to gain a conviction. See Linda Loyd, D.A. Defends Her Release of Videotape,
Phila. Inquirer, Apr. 4, 1997, at Al.
244. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) (requiring that
the defendant produce some evidence that similarly situated defendants of other races
could have been prosecuted but were not).
245. See supra notes 189-201 and accompanying text.
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At least one scholar has suggested that the legal process achieved
through selective prosecution hearings serves a useful purpose despite
the improbability of success on the merits. Professor Anne Bowen
Poulin argues that courts should continue to consider claims of selec-
tive prosecution despite the restrictions imposed since Armstrong be-
cause "[e]ven if the court ultimately denied relief, the exposure of
disparate treatment through legal process may effect some reduction
in improper selective prosecution as the government and the public
respond to reduce or eliminate improper disparity." '246 The use of ra-
cial impact studies in selective prosecution hearings would certainly
help to achieve this goal.
C. Enforcement Through Legislation
National and state legislation should be enacted to require the use
of racial impact reports in prosecution offices because reliance on vol-
untary efforts may not produce significant results. Few elected prose-
cutors are motivated to campaign on themes involving the promotion
of racial equality.247 Like most politicians, prosecutors view "tough
on crime" themes as the most effective tools to assure re-election. 48
Legislation requiring the production and publication of racial impact
studies would give prosecutors the necessary political cover. If the
studies were required by law, no prosecutor could be accused of being
246. Poulin, supra note 25, at 1090. Professor Poulin maintains that this type of
"soft enforcement" would allow the public to receive information that "may prompt a
demand for more careful exercise of prosecutorial discretion." Id.
247. In San Francisco, District Attorney Terence Hallinan has championed commu-
nity prosecution. He has ordered Assistant D.A.'s in his office to visit city neighbor-
hoods wearing jackets emblazoned with the words "Community District Attorney."
Maura Dolan, A Liberal Lays Down the Law in S.F., L.A. Times, Apr. 5, 1997, at Al.
Arguing that a prosecutor's job goes beyond simply prosecuting, Hallinan says that
prosecutors must go to "high-crime neighborhoods to 'get to know the people and tell
them how they can help their police and district attorneys. We have to break down
the barriers of mistrust between the minorities and the criminal justice system.'" NVl-
Ham Claiborne, San Francisco Prosecutor Tries 'Something Different': Cusader Ap-
plies Liberal Traditions to New Ditties, Wash. Post, Feb. 20, 1996, at A3. Hallinan has
spurred efforts to involve gang members in community activities, told A.DA's to seek
mentoring programs for many drug offenders instead of jail sentences, and refused to
enforce California's stringent three-strikes-and-you're-out law against nonviolent re-
peat offenders. Id. He justifies community punishment for drug possession cases so
that court dockets can be cleared for major drug traffickers and other serious offend-
ers. Id "[Llet's get the other junk out of the courtroom, the simple possessions and
the kid on the street selling a rock or two of crack cocaine. The courts are so cluttered
with these cases that when you get real [sic] serious crimes, it's a year or more before
you can bring them to trial. It's crazy," says Hallinan. Id. He also opposes imprison-
ing large numbers of small-time drug dealers because of "the disparate impact it has
on minority communities." Id
248. See Tonry, supra note 10, at 179-80 (discussing how politicians see "tough on
crime" themes as a route to re-election). Elected judges sometimes are also tempted
to appear tough on crime. See Stephen B. Bright & Patricia J. Keenan, Judges and the
Politics of Death: Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Newt Election in Capital
Cases, 75 B.U. L. Rev. 759, 776-92 (1995).
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"soft on crime" for focusing her attention on these issues. Further-
more, since the legislation would not require that prosecutors take any
particular action, but would require only the collection and publica-
tion of information, it would not be subject to the criticisms raised by
the Supreme Court in Wayte v. United States. 249
D. The Impact of the Publication of Racial Impact Studies
The publication of racial impact studies should have a significant
impact on prosecutors, police, and the general public. Although it is
difficult to determine what that impact would be, the goal would be to
deter policies and practices that have a discriminatory impact on Afri-
can Americans and other people of color, and encourage the develop-
ment of policies and practices that would further the equitable
treatment of defendants and victims of crime, regardless of race. This
section will explore possible responses to the proposal.
1. The Response of Prosecutors
Prosecutors might object to racial impact studies and/or the publica-
tion of the studies as a significant interference with their law enforce-
ment duties. Criticisms would undoubtedly include the Supreme
Court's reasons for deferring to prosecutorial discretion in Wayte v.
United States: "Examining the basis of a prosecution delays the crimi-
nal proceeding, threatens to chill law enforcement by subjecting the
prosecutor's motives and decisionmaking to outside inquiry, and may
undermine prosecutorial effectiveness by revealing the Government's
enforcement policy." '
Prosecutors understandably would be concerned about the time and
resources necessary to implement racial impact studies. The prosecu-
tor's primary function is law enforcement; 251 any undertaking which
substantially interferes with that responsibility would be subject to le-
gitimate criticism. If the collection of data were a tedious process that
substantially interfered with the performance of important
prosecutorial duties, most prosecutors would object to the studies.
Prosecutors, however, could collect the relevant information in an ef-
ficient, non-intrusive manner. Prosecutorial offices could create forms
with checklists on which the prosecutors could quickly and easily note
249. 470 U.S. 598 (1985); see supra notes 198-200 and accompanying text. In fact,
such recordkeeping is already required by various civil rights and environmental laws.
Cf J. Gordon Arbuckle et al., Environmental Law Handbook § 3.1 (11th ed. 1991)
(discussing pervasiveness of reporting requirements in environmental statutes); Har-
old S. Lewis, Jr., Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Law § 5.9 (1997) (dis-
cussing employer recordkeeping requirements under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964).
250. 470 U.S. at 607.
251. See id.
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the relevant information. 52 Most prosecutors routinely make written
entries in case files whenever an action is taken in a particular case.
These forms or checklists could be kept in the same case file and
would involve no more time than the routine case file entries. The
only difference would be the type of information and the format for its
collection.
Tune is not the only relevant factor. Few prosecutor offices would
have the expertise or resources to perform the necessary statistical
analysis of the collected data. Social scientists or other researchers
with expertise in this field would have to be hired, and few prosecutor
offices have the financial resources for such an investment. Although
prosecutor offices tend to have more financial resources than de-
fender offices, 2 3 many prosecutor offices lack the resources to ade-
quately perform their basic prosecutorial responsibilities efficiently
and effectively.5 4
One possible solution to the resource problem may be the volunteer
efforts of local colleges and universities. Criminology and criminal
justice departments may be willing to conduct such research and
would provide a wealth of resources through the use of graduate stu-
dents from various departments. The studies would provide a great
public service as well as a rich academic experience for professors,
scholars, and students. Use of university resources would also give the
project the necessary objectivity that would be lacking if the project
were conducted by the prosecutors themselves.
Prosecutors may claim that the publication of the studies may chill
law enforcement by subjecting the prosecutor's motives to outside in-
quiry. This argument suggests that prosecutors may be hesitant to
prosecute certain cases if they believe that members of the public,
criminal defendants, or victims will question their decisions. Thus,
some criminal activity will not be prosecuted.
252. See Thomas and Fitch, supra note 90, at 523-24 (advocating that prosecutors
use forms and checklists to record the basis of their charging decisions).
253. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Sourcebook of Criminal
Justice Statistics 13 tbl.1.11 (1995) (displaying the Federal Criminal Justice Budget for
the fiscal years 1995 (actual) and 1996-2002 (estimated)); see also Kenneth B. Nunn,
The Trial as Text Allegory, Myth and Symbol in the Adversarial Criminal Process-A
Critique of the Role of the Public Defender and a Proposal for Reform, 32 Am. Crim.
L. Rev. 743, 802-13 (1995) (describing the funding disparity between prosecutors and
public defenders); Gerald Lefcourt et al., Justice That Makes Sense, Champion, Dec.
1997, at 6, 6 (discussing how public defender services have been drastically reduced
while funding for federal law enforcement, prosecution and prison construction has
grown dramatically).
254. Robert L. Spangenberg & Tessa J. Schwartz, The Indigent Defense Crisis is
Chronic: Balanced Allocation of Resources is Needed to End the Constitutional Crisis,
Crim. Just., Summer 1994, at 13, 13 (discussing the lack of public resources devoted to
the criminal justice system and arguing that instead of putting more police on the
street and building more prisons, more resources should be devoted to the prosecu-
tion, the courts, and public defense).
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The goal of the publication of the studies is not to chill appropriate
and fair law enforcement, but to totally eliminate unfair, discrimina-
tory law enforcement. To the extent that law enforcement tactics or
prosecutorial policies discriminate based on race, they should not
merely be chilled-they should be entirely eliminated and replaced
with tactics that enforce the law fairly and impartially. The studies,
and the knowledge that they will be published, should cause prosecu-
tors to be more careful and meticulous in making decisions. They
should motivate prosecutors to assure that similarly situated victims
and defendants are treated equitably.
The Supreme Court's concern that judicial interference with
prosecutorial discretion would undermine prosecutorial effectiveness
by revealing the government's enforcement policy cannot apply to the
publication of racial impact studies. That argument suggests that if
the public is aware of how and under what circumstances cases are
prosecuted, they will adjust their behavior to avoid prosecution. For
example, if the public is aware that a prosecutor has a policy of only
prosecuting cases involving more than five grams of cocaine, dealers
and users will only distribute or possess quantities less than five
grams. The publication of racial impact studies should not raise this
concern because the studies would not reveal specific law enforcement
policies. The information would be limited to racial and other demo-
graphic data.
2. The Response of Law Enforcement Officers
The studies may reveal that police or other law enforcement officers
are disproportionately arresting African American criminal defend-
ants. 55 Such information may prompt an inquiry of the police chief
or federal law enforcement agent and subject him to the same ac-
countability as the prosecutor. The police would be compelled to ex-
plain racially disparate arrest patterns. If the public were not satisfied
with the explanation, the chief may be required to develop policies
designed to eliminate the unacceptable practices.
If the studies implicate police in discriminatory behavior, they may
cause tension between prosecutors and police. Prosecutors must rely
on the cooperation of police officers and other law enforcement of-
ficers long after they complete the arrest process. Police officers con-
tinue to investigate cases during the grand jury process and help
prosecutors prepare for trials and other hearings. The testimony of
arresting officers and other law enforcement personnel is almost al-
ways needed in grand jury and trial proceedings. Preparation for trial
and other proceedings would certainly be more difficult for prosecu-
tors with hostile, uncooperative law enforcement officers.
255. See supra notes 91-103 and accompanying text.
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By declining to prosecute cases where they suspect police miscon-
duct, prosecutors may deter discriminatory law enforcement. Such ac-
tion would compel police to develop policies to ferret out
discriminatory practices and promote the fair and equitable enforce-
ment of the law. "6 Ideally, prosecutors and police would work to-
gether to establish these policies in their respective offices. Such
collaborative efforts would have to be voluntary, as police and prose-
cutors are generally governed by different political entities. 5 7
3. The Response of the General Public
One of the primary goals of the publication of racial impact studies
is to inspire the electorate to hold prosecutors accountable for their
actions. The public would require prosecutors to explain statistics
which suggest discriminatory practices and would compel them to
remedy the disparities if they found the explanations to be unsatisfac-
tory. Prosecutors who failed to remedy unacceptable disparities
would be voted out of office.
One possible criticism of this proposal is its possible ineffectiveness
in communities in which African Americans are a small minority of
the population. One might argue that such minority communities may
not be able to effectively influence prosecutorial decisions because of
their lack of political power. Such criticisms assume that white voters
do not care about issues of racial disparity and discrimination which
harm African Americans. If such a view proved to be true in certain
communities, the widespread publication of such information might
serve to stigmatize those communities and indirectly force a change in
policies or practices."5 s
256. For a bill introduced by Congressman John Conyers that would require police
to keep records of the race of persons detained in traffic stops to determine if police
are using discriminatory tactics, see H.R. 118, 105th Cong. (1998).
257. State and local prosecutors are generally independent, elected officials, see
supra note 236, while police chiefs are often appointed by the mayor or county execu-
tive. In the federal system, United States Attorneys and the chiefs of law enforce-
ment agencies such as the FBI, CIA and the DEA are all under the jurisdiction of the
Attorney General of the United States. Thus, the Attorney General could order such
collaborative efforts in her discretion.
258. Simi Valley, California, has gained a worldwide reputation for racism since the
city served as the site of the Rodney King beating trial. One city resident, on a medi-
cal mission in the jungles of Brazil, was being introduced to villagers through an inter-
preter. When asked where he was from, the man replied, "Simi Valley." A boy thenjumped up and said, "Rodney King! Rodney King!" Mack Reed, Negative Image Cre-
ated by Trial Haunts Simi Valley, L.A. Times, Apr. 28, 1997, at A3. City leaders have
struggled mightily to repair the city's image, with very little success. Id.
The Arizona legislature's rejection of the Martin Luther King, Jr. holiday in 1990
led to a wave of 166 convention cancellations in the state and the moving of Super
Bowl XXVII to California. Voters approved the holiday in 1992. Mike Mulligan, Sec-
ond Effort for Arizona; Three Years Later, State Gets Its Super Bowl, Chicago Sun-
Times, Jan. 22, 1996, at 70.
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Even if the studies were published in communities with a politically
powerful African American community, the proposal assumes that
these communities would view the racial disparities as harmful. Pro-
fessor Randall Kennedy, however, has a different view. He is a propo-
nent of laws and practices which provide more law enforcement
resources to African American communities, even those laws or prac-
tices may have a racially discriminatory impact on African American
criminal defendants. He argues that such law enforcement only harms
African Americans who violate the law while benefiting law-abiding
African American citizens. 9
There is much evidence suggesting that Professor Kennedy's view is
not the prevailing sentiment in most African American communi-
ties. 6° African Americans led the fight to change federal cocaine
sentencing laws which discriminate against them. 261 Numerous civil
rights organizations, including the National Association for the Ad-
vancement of Colored People, the National Rainbow Coalition, the
National Council of Negro Women, the Southern Christian Leader-
ship Conference, and the National Political Congress of Black Women
fought to eliminate the sentencing disparities which discriminate
against African Americans." The National Black Police Organiza-
tion, the Progressive Baptist Convention, and the National Black Cau-
cus of State Legislators-African American organizations which
represent vastly different constituencies-also lobbied to eliminate
the discriminatory aspects of the law. 63
Despite the efforts of these groups, the recommendation of the
United States Sentencing Commission,264 and the opposition of Con-
259. See Randall Kennedy, The State, Criminal Law, and Racial Discrimination: A
Comment, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1255, 1256 (1994) ("[T]he main problem confronting
black communities in the United States is not excessive policing and invidious punish-
ment but rather a failure of the state to provide black communities with the equal
protection of the laws.").
260. Professor Kennedy's defense of laws and enforcement practices which dispro-
portionately impact African American communities has also been widely criticized by
legal scholars. See Paul Butler, (Color) Blind Faith: The Tragedy of Race, Crime, and
the Law, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 1270 (1998); David Cole, The Paradox of Race and Crime:
A Comment on Randall Kennedy's "Politics of Distinction", 83 Geo. L.J. 2547 (1995);
Kim Taylor-Thompson, The Politics of Common Ground, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 1306
(1998).
261. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 6371, 102 Stat. 4181,
4370 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 844(a)), established penalties for the possession and dis-
tribution of crack cocaine that were 20 times more severe than the penalties for the
same amount of powder cocaine. Although 52% of reported crack users in 1991 were
white, 84.5% of defendants convicted of possession of cocaine in 1993 were black. See
National Institute on Drug Abuse, National Household Survey on Drug Abuse: Pop-
ulation Estimates 1991, at 38 tbl.5-B (1993).
262. See Nkechi Taifa, Cracked Justice: A Critical Examination of Cocaine Sentenc-
ing, 27 U. West L.A. L. Rev. 107 (1996).
263. Id.
264. See Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 60
Fed. Reg. 25,074 (proposed May 10, 1995).
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gressional Black Caucus,265 Congress passed legislation maintaining
the disparity in sentencing between crack and powder cocaine of-
fenses.26 6 President Clinton refused to veto Congress's action.267
The response of widely divergent segments of the African Ameri-
can community to the discriminatory federal cocaine laws suggests
that African Americans will be troubled by studies revealing that law
enforcement and prosecutorial practices have a racially discrimina-
tory impact. That experience also suggests that the African American
community will take action to assure that discriminatory policies and
practices are eliminated. Although the efforts in opposition to the co-
caine laws were not totally successful, they did prompt some action.
In 1997, Attorney General Janet Reno recommended that the federal
cocaine laws be amended to reduce the disparity from 100:1 to 10:1.21
Although this compromise did not achieve the stated goal, it demon-
strates how political action can hold elected officials accountable.
CONCLUSION
The biblical quote cited at the beginning of this article has a simple
meaning: From whom much is given, much is expected. Prosecutors
have been given more power and discretion than any other criminal
justice official, so they have a greater ability to affect change where it
is needed. The Supreme Court has not required much of prosecutors,
but the Court's standards should serve as a floor rather than a ceiling,
as a base rather than a goal. Prosecutors can, and should, seek to
eliminate racial disparities regardless of blame and intent. They can,
and should, set a higher standard of performance for themselves than
the requirements set by the Supreme Court. They have both the
power and privilege to do so. The publication of racial impact studies
will help to assure that they do.
265. See Taifa, supra note 262, at 113.
266. 1d
267. Id.
268. Peter Baker, Clinton Would Cut Disparity in Some Cocaine Sentences, Wash.
Post, July 23, 1997, at A2.
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